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Power Struggle in the Indian Ocean

COLONEL SATISH TALWAR, VSM

"Let it be known to your Majesty that if you are strong in ships the commerce of the Indies is yours; and if you are not strong in ships, little will avail you any fortress on land".

—Franco De Almeida
to King of Portugal, 1505 AD

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Historical Survey. The Indian Ocean is considerably smaller than the Pacific or Atlantic. It is an enormous gulf surrounded by the continents of Africa, Asia and Australia. In the words of K M Panikkar, "It is walled off on three sides by land with the Southern sides of Asia forming a roof over it. What differentiates this ocean from the other two is not the two sides but the sub-continent of India which juts out far into the sea for a thousand miles to its tapering end at Cape Comorin the Indian Ocean has some features of a land locked sea." Geography provides the infrastructure for historical and political as well as cultural and economic development. From times immemorial the Northern section of the ocean has been a much frequented waterway. Beside being the home of three major civilisations, that is Hindu, Buddhist and Islam, this area has also witnessed around its periphery, the movement of peoples and ideas, the impact of nations on each other, clashes and conquests. At the end of fifteenth century, when the Portuguese made their dramatic entry into the Indian Ocean, no major navy plied these waters and no country sought to exercise maritime control in the region. Portugal, under Vasco de Gama not only opened the trade route to fabulous India but also turned the flanks of the Islamic world. Later, the "de Gama" epoch also brought in its wake an era of control of the Indian Ocean and its riparian territories by outside powers. Thus, the original thrust by way of trade and religion gave way to colonial acquisitions on a scale unprecedented in earlier centuries. This was also as a consequence of great power rivalries and conflicts between European powers at home and abroad. Thus, the non-regional control of the Indian Ocean area did not end in 1945 but was only a pause prior to a power struggle to dominate this area with renewed energy and vigour.

Contemporary Period. The post World War II period has seen that the power relations between littoral states of the Indian Ocean, also depend upon the balance of power existing outside the area. Most countries continue to seek security and stability by manipulating their relations with non-regional powers under the mantle of desired distribution of forces. The atmosphere of suspicion, quarrel and conflict between regional powers necessarily draws attention of outside powers to these developments which also help in furthering their own aims guided by priorities as to the strategic value of individual countries or places. From 1945 to 1972, there have been 59 military clashes, coups d' etat or revolts amongst the countries of the Indian Ocean area. Thus these rivalries tend to trigger off a renewed subjugation of the littoral states by powers who are also keen to check-mate the interests of their rivals whilst subscribing to their geo-strategic considerations and global aims. And here, "gunboat" diplomacy also pays dividends because unlike a land army, it does not violate international law at sea whilst threatening or laying a pacific blockade. The Cuban crisis and the sailing of the US Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal are case in point.

The Power Game. Today, the Indian Ocean littoral states are rife with conflict made worse by super powers. The more pronounced geo-strategic, economic and political factors like the entry of the Soviet Navy on the high seas, the offensive stance provided by the Indian Ocean to nuclear submarines against the Russian 'underbelly', the location of 62 percent of world's oil resources and other minerals in this region, the potential of certain littoral states to interfere with ocean traffic at vital choke-points, the abundance of petro-dollars, the vast markets for finished goods and last but not the least, the political instability have all helped generate a renewed interest of outside powers in the Indian Ocean area. The difference in scene when De Gama entered these waters in 1505 AD is that this time Russia, China and Japan have also evinced interest which may be political, economic or both. The power struggle has thus begun. Various Zone of Peace proposals, UN resolutions to limit extra regional presence remain a 'pipe dream'. Too much is at stake. The question that arises is what is India's interest and response to these challenges. As a dominant regional power what would be India's options? Will she rely on her own strength? Would she seek regional cooperation? or would she generate an international initiative to minimise the super-power impact insofar as her interests are concerned? Unfortunately, there is no historical model which may

even loosely provide a solution as to India's response. This then forms the background to this paper.

GEOPOLITICAL DETERMINANTS

Location. The Indian Ocean is the only ocean that does not wash the shores of any of the world powers. The Indian sub-continent juts more than 1500 miles along its maritime latitudes. It has on its flanks two of the world's most sensitive areas. To the West there is West Asia, an area of competitive struggle. To the East, there is SE Asia which because of resurgent China has become sensitive to the ambitions and ideological fervor of that country.

The Peoples. The area contains one third (one thousand million) of the world's population. If judged solely on the basis of ethnicity, culture and religion, there is hardly any unity in the area. Yet the region is clearly divided on cultural and religious grounds. There are massive Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist and also Christian centres from where waves of influences branched out creating new centres as well as ethnic and religious diasporas of many shades.

Strategic Areas. Access to and egress from the Indian Ocean can generally be controlled from four focal points. These are : Cape of Good Hope, The Suez Canal, the Indonesian Straits and the Tasmanian Sea. Two additional points could be the Gulf of Aden and Oman. Impediments to maritime trade or transportation at these stated points would immediately effect most littoral states.

Countries Around the Ocean. There are as many as 36 countries on the periphery of this ocean. Most of them are developing countries. Except for South Africa, Australia and Singapore, most nations have yet to achieve a reasonable standard of living. India which ranks amongst the top ten industrialised nations of the world, ranks amongst the lowest insofar as standard of living is concerned. The oil bonanza which has descended on some of the Gulf countries has created another dimension.

Resources of the Area. The area possesses a wealth of resources. The production of some of the highly sought minerals and traditional products is well known. Insofar as the sea-bed resources are concerned, these are available for askance. These could be categorised as under :—

(a) *Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits.* The seabed potential of oil and natural gas has yet to be compiled. But India's own strike at Bombay High and very favourable indications in the Godawari Basin, Palk Straits, Andaman Islands complex and the Bengal Bay are pointers to a rich potential in the Indian Ocean area.

(b) *Food.* The Ocean abounds in fish. It is estimated that the sea-bed can sustain a yearly harvesting of 11-20 million tons of fish.

(c) *Minerals.* Surveys conducted reveal rich deposits of nodules of manganese oxide which contain varying degrees of 30 odd metals. It has been calculated that one square mile of the seabed where nodules are found may be covered with 70,000 tons of minerals which would yield in value about £ 4,00,000 a square mile of the following :—

- (i) 30,000 tons of iron ore
- (ii) 3,600 tons of aluminium
- (iii) 2,300 tons of manganese
- (iv) 400 tons of cobalt
- (v) 1,200 tons of nickel
- (vi) 650 tons of copper.

Economic Interest of Big Powers

(a) *Foreign Investments.* Encouraged by the abundance of resources, water and cheap labour, the Western countries and Japan have made huge investments in various fields of industry. The pattern followed follows the norm of :—

- (i) Large scale manufactures for domestic markets in the populous countries like India, Indonesia, Pakistan etc.
- (ii) Export oriented manufacture and extractive industries in the South East Asian countries.
- (iii) Direct investment in oil as in the Middle East.
- (iv) Plantation interests in tea, tobacco etc in African and South Asian countries.
- (b) *Market for Surplus Industrial Goods.* Due to industrial backwardness of the region and lack of scientific know-how, the countries of this region import sophisticated machinery and manufactured goods leaving a large deficit. Of late, to recycle the petro dollars most Western nations are selling large quantities of modern arms to West Asian countries.

Trade Pattern. About 80% of Western Europe oil and growing proportion of that of USA passes through the Indian Ocean. 70% of the strategic materials used by NATO countries follow the same route. Over 90% of Japan's oil needs and a significant quantity of other imports follow the same pattern. The trade with the West is going to increase further when the Suez Canal is widened to accept supertankers of 2,60,000 dwt. The pattern of trade of other important countries is as under :—

- (a) East African nations — 83%
- (b) India — 85%
- (c) Australia — 65%

Nuclear Launchpad. With the advent of submarine launched ballistic missiles, the Indian Ocean sea-beds, specially those in the Arabian Sea land themselves to a first or second strike nuclear capability to the USA against targets in the under-belly of Russia. Unfortunately, the Soviet Navy operating in these waters is far removed from the American shores.

MARITIME POWERS OF THE REGION

Of the nations having access to the Indian Ocean, possibly twelve countries could be termed as maritime nations of this region. These are, Australia, Burma, Indonesia, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Phillippines, and Egypt. Unfortunately, none of their navies can be classified as full-fledged. In the case of India, she cannot even claim primacy with China.

BALANCE OF POWER AND ALL THAT

GENERAL

Most of the countries of the region gained independence in the period following World War II. Some of their frontiers rest along artificial boundaries. This factor alongwith old rifts and suspicions, have helped create a scene where the littoral states have sought security and stability by manipulating their relations with outside powers under the mantle of a desired distribution of forces.

THE POWER VACUUM

It is often concluded that the British withdrawal from "East of Suez" in 1968 created a power vacuum in what was once termed a 'British Lake'. However, it is not so much as this alleged vacuum as the self-interests of littoral states that have offered bases and facilities to outside powers. Even in the days of the British Raj, when the Japanese did enter the Ocean in 1942, there was nobody to stop them. It, therefore, proves that political or military vacuum exists only if an area belonging to a sphere of interest is declared as "disinterested". So the vacuum existed or exists because the regional countries have allowed it to happen. Insofar as the high seas are concerned, all of them are open to all navies during peace time and denied to certain powers in case of war only. But in either contingency, local facilities are vital.

LOCAL CONFLICTS AND CONSTRAINTS

SURVEY OF PRESENT SITUATION

A cluster of local balances exist. Groups of nations are interconnected by a chain of relationships, pressures and counter-pressures.

This balance is shifted as weighted by extra regional influences leading to instability. The economic, social and cultural diversities further help the game of check-mating and changing partners.

One frequently hears of a collective resolution against extra regional presence on talks of zone of peace but oddly enough there has yet to be a formal meeting on this count by the littoral powers. In fact, these countries have yet to decide the position of countries in the hinterland whilst harmonising their approach towards the 'Law of the Seas' agenda before the UN.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

The regional countries have shown a pronounced tendency in diverting their scarce resources towards defence spending and grandiose schemes. Further, some of the nations cannot concede a more dominant role for other regional countries. Then some nations tend to adorn a 'predestined attitude' while dealing with lesser neighbours. Lastly, despite propogation of non-alignment and non-interference, quite a few littoral states have subtle arrangements and treaties with outside powers. Thus local issues become embroiled and meshed into world politics by virtue of such arrangements and connections

INTERESTS OF NON-REGIONAL POWERS

GENERAL

To recapitulate, it is essential to discern the motives that drive the super-powers to indulge in rivalry and struggle in the Indian Ocean area which for all intents and purposes is the new heart of the world in terms of strategic imperatives and for a medley of economic and political reasons, the area for future power struggle. To summarise, the following are the prime motives :—

(a) *Energy Needs.* One of the major sources of conflicts today can be encapsuled in a single word : Oil. The energy needs of the industrialised world dictate a profound concern with access to the oil resources in the Persian Gulf and with the security of the tanker routes across the Indian Ocean.

(b) *Economic Considerations.* Beside the onshore resources of this area, and heavy financial investments by outside powers, the sea-bed resources in terms of marine food, minerals, metals and energy hold high promise for the future. Then, because of industrial backwardness the area is most suitable for dumping finished goods. It is recalled that it was the economic interest that lured outside powers to this area leading to eventual colonial rule.

(c) *Arms Sale.* USA, USSR, UK and France accounted for 80% of arms export during 1974-78; and the developing countries accounted for 75% of the imports during the stated period. This also helps the Western nations to recycle the petro-dollars. To quote, US sources have assessed that of the \$144 billion Saudi five year development plan, \$24 billion will be spent on arms. Our own Jaguar and Mirage deals are case in point. Thus there are political and economic stakes in this region which cannot be wished away.

(d) *Political Ideology.* In extending their political and ideological influences, both USA and USSR have entered the Indian Ocean area in a big way. With near stabilisation in Europe and the powerful US influence in Latin America, the thrust is now towards the Asian and African continents. This extension of political ideology is not a lone thrust but is a part of a multi-pronged quest for a strategic, political and economic advantage.

(e) *White Afro-Asian Settlements.* The white settlements of Australia, Newzealand and South Africa are the outposts of the Western world. Further, these countries are rich in minerals and farm produce. Heavy investments have been made. South Africa alone has foreign capital sunk to the extent of \$20 billion. Despite racial policies, the West is not going to abandon these countries; and President Reagan has categorically stated so in a TV interview on 05 Mar 81. Lastly, the Cape route is vital to Western interests. When the Suez Canal was closed after 1967, 2600 ships passed by the Cape route each year.

(f) *Impact of SLBMs.* As has been stated earlier, the heartland of Russia and China can be reached from launchpads in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. This furthers Russian aims in protecting her 'underbelly' from US submarines operating in the Indian Ocean.

(g) *Regional Balancing.* In most occasions the littoral states have sought 'super-power' umbrella before confronting or balancing of their adversary at a point in time. Their credibility and prestige is also linked with their physical presence and their ability to influence events to their clients gain and own advantage.

US NAVAL PRESENCE

Background. Prior to 1945, USA had no defence arrangements or naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Even in the Fifties, America was content in playing an ancillary role to UK. But the British withdrawal East of Suez, the emergence of cold war and fear of communist China's shadow in SE Asia and in the Pacific changed all this. The credence to the 'domino theory' with regard to communism made her sit up and look West beyond Subie Bay. The oil crisis was the veering point towards her involvement in the Indian Ocean area.

US Interests. Here it will be apt to quote Admiral E Zumwalt Jr, ex Chief of US Naval Operations, "The Indian Ocean has become the area with the potential to produce major shifts in the global balance over the next decades. It follows that we must have the ability to influence events in that area, and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence". Other elements contributing her geo-strategic philosophy are :—

- (a) The need for West Asian Oil for her energy requirements and the allied obligation to control the sea lanes to it.
- (b) Seek safe haven for deployment of her Posidon SLBMs and facilities for a rapid deployment force (RDF) for a quick military response.
- (c) Opportunity to contain communism and Russian influence.
- (d) Obligation of her treaties with allies in the area and safeguard of white settlements in South Africa and Australia.

US Military Objectives. In pursuit of her overall aims, the US has sought following military objectives in the Indian Ocean area :—

- (a) Maintenance of an off-shore defensive posture involving 'jump off' points and allied communication links and service facilities.
- (b) Deployment of RDF with a 'fire brigade' role in the area.
- (c) Operate an Indian Ocean version of the Sixth Fleet.
- (d) Control the naval 'choke-points' and thus link up with the Pacific and Atlantic fleets.

PURSUIT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES

(a) USA continues to seek naval facilities along her oil and other sea routes around the Cape in the West, Suez in the middle and ASEAN countries in the East. Presently, she has facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Diego Garcia, South Africa, Australia and Singapore. It is alleged that she is also seeking facilities at Gwadar along the Makran coast of Pakistan.

(b) Considering the political consequences of a military presence on shore of her allies like Arabia etc, USA is still to decide the location of her RDF. Contenders are Pakistan, Egypt and Israel. As it stands, Diego Garcia is 4000 kms away and Russia is deployed closer to the oil countries. A presence in West Asia itself is therefore necessary. It is likely that the US peace-keeping force between Egypt and Israel will be one link of the RDF with the others being at Gwadar and Diego Garcia.

(c) Conversion of the Diego Garcia atoll into a major facility in the Indian Ocean. About \$1 billion are being spent to ultimately station a force of 16,000 personnel with requisite repositioned

hardware, facilities and shipping. The airfield has been strengthened to receive even B-52 bombers. The proposed Indian Ocean task force will have 150 planes and 36 warships to include three aircraft carriers. AWACs will also be positioned for patrolling the Ocean fleets of other nations.

Implications for India. The US military thrust into the Indian Ocean has created the following implications for India :—

- (a) Buildup of Pakistan as the Eastern flank against Russian intrusion towards the Ocean.
- (b) A loose alliance or an informal grouping of Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Bangladesh. Pakistan would always draw on the material and financial resources of Arabia in this case.
- (c) If possible, involve Pakistan as part of the RDF thereby increasing her military potential far beyond her security needs.
- (d) Has sought base at St. Martin's Island near Chittagong in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has formally denied this.
- (e) USA may seek presence in Sri Lanka should the latter lean heavily towards it. The facilities at Trincomalee continue to attract outsiders.
- (f) In case of another Indo-Pak conflict, USA could provide the following : from Gwadan and Garcia :—
 - (i) Pre-positioned hardware.
 - (ii) Surveillance over Indian naval movements and early warning.
 - (iii) Protect Gwadan and Karachi by presence of US ships in these harbours.
 - (iv) Release Pakistani ships for other tasks.

UNITED KINGDOM

Background. British naval power in the Indian Ocean area has been on a steady decline since the formulation of the "East of Suez" policy in 1967. Britain has thus progressively withdrawn from Singapore, Aden and the Persian Gulf. She has, however, retained a nominal presence in Hongkong, Gan, Malaysia, Singapore and Borneo comprising the following elements :—

- (a) *Navy.* About 700 personnel and around five frigates/destroyers.
- (b) *Army.* 12,500 personnel, mostly at Gan and Malaysia.
- (c) *Airforce.* About 500 personnel, mostly at Gan and Malaysia.
- (d) *Reserve.* The above forces could be augmented by elements of the Army Strategic Reserve Stationed in UK.

British Interests in the Region. These are as under :—

- (a) Safeguard her economic assets and interests.
- (b) Safe passage through the two vital choke-points *i.e.*, the Cape route and Straits of Malaca.
- (c) Seek staging posts to her colonies and territories in the region.
- (d) Where possible, counter Russian influence.
- (e) Provide strength and psychological assurance to Singapore and Malaysia with whom she has formal defence agreement.

Capability. Britain has neither military capability nor the economic strength of USA to influence events at far off places all by herself. The Falkland War clearly brought this out. Beside protection of her assets and maritime trade she would endeavour to achieve more through diplomatic means than by a military muscle.

RUSSIA

Background. Till the early Fifties, Russian expansion was in the form of annexing areas contiguous to her borders. Her territorial aggrandisement was, however, thwarted by her lack of 'warm water' ports, relatively poor economy and a stubborn resistance by other powers. During the time of the Korean war, a deliberate attempt was made for a naval presence around the world—an extension of Russia's ideological, political and economic strategy. But it was not till the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 that made the Russians realise the implications of sea-power. An all-out war mode; and today she is a worthy competitor to the US Navy except perhaps in carrier force. But the result of all this has been that :—

- (a) The Soviet Navy has emerged from the shelter of the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Sea of Japan to range over water that rarely saw the Russian ensign before.
- (b) The merchant fleet is growing a million tons gross each year. In 1970, the Russians had 456 merchant ships under construction to USA's 51.
- (c) Well over 60% of the Russian merchant fleet is less than ten years old compared to 70% of USA which is close to twenty years.
- (d) She is engaged in a world-wide oceanographic research and surveys that covers the whole spectrum of naval activity.

Limitations of Soviet Naval Potential. Despite her world-wide involvement, the full power of the Soviet Navy is limited by the following factors :—

- (a) Paucity of carrier-borne airforce and shore facilities restrict her naval influence to a few hundred miles from Soviet mainland

or a friendly country. Insofar as shore facilities are concerned, she is trying to correct this posture.

(b) Her navy is split into four fleet areas (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific) which are not only isolated from each other but their exit points are check-mated by the Western fleets in the North Sea, Baltic, Turkey and the Sea of Japan.

(c) She does not have warm water ports of her own. Any movement into the Indian Ocean can be dominated by the Western nations alongwith their allies at the choke-points around the Cape, Straits of Malaca and the Suez Canal.

Soviet Global Interests. These are as under :—

(a) Neutralise Western influence and threat by a matching naval presence. This would also lend flexibility to her role as a super-power.

(b) Protection of her own economic and political interests around the world.

(c) Encourage weaker nations, particularly third world countries to challenge Western nations in areas of conflict or dual interest.

(d) Protection of her soft under-belly from launch pads in and around Indian Ocean area.

(e) Seek ingress into the oil producing countries.

Presence in the Indian Ocean. In 1885, a Petersburg newspaper urged an advance towards the Indian Ocean thus fulfilling Russia's historic destiny. This was also obvious in the Secret Protocol of 1940 in which Russia declared that her territorial aspirations centre South in the direction of the Indian Ocean. To recall, the entire British foreign policy insofar as imperial India was concerned hinged around the framework of keeping the 'Russian bear' away. The Russians are patiently working towards their desired thrust. Let there be no mistake about it. Her walking into Afghanistan and the now renewed influence in Iran are deliberate steps in her quest to obtain 'warm-water ports' not only to consolidate her naval influence in the area, but also open up the hinterland whilst flanking the coveted oil producing nations of the Persian Gulf. Today, on the average Russia maintains a task force of 30 vessels to include nuclear powered submarines in the Indian Ocean area. She has already acquired facilities at Aden, Socotra, Ethiopia and mooring facilities at Seychelles and Mauritius. Others in proximity are those in Libya, Algeria and Syria. Her interests in the area specially revolving around the following factors :—

(a) A safe-guard for her expanding trade in this area which is also used as a political weapon as well.

(b) Psychological support to her diplomatic moves and to take advantage of opportunities for intervention or causing pressure in a crisis.

- (c) Protection of the 'underbelly' by countering moves of the US Navy in particular.
- (d) Containing Chinese influence in the area. Her call for an Asian Security is a cloaked rejoinder towards this aspect.
- (e) Seek an alternative route to her Far Eastern region in case her Trans-Siberian and Turkistan-Siberian rail communications are disrupted.
- (f) Provide a link between her Black Sea and Pacific fleets through the Indian Ocean and across SE Asia.

Implications for India. The Russian influence in the Indian Ocean area is steadily growing; but she will continue to be in number two position to the US in this region for some time more. Russians thrust towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea beside creating a world crisis will physically bring a super-power into the Indian Ocean. This prospect should be as unwelcome to India as the presence of any other non-regional power.

CHINA

Background. China is fast approaching the super power status. When she does so, her minimum ambition would be to regard SE Asia as her own 'backyard'. And under its role as a "world revolutionary", enhance her influence and power among the Afro-Asian countries. Some of the factors in her favour are as under :—

- (a) Its proximity to the area and image of 'Asian-ness' vis-a-vis Russia and America.
- (b) Appeal of her ideological to the 'have nots' of the Indian Ocean area.
- (c) Large number of overseas Chinese residing in SE Asia and her prestige acquired by her possessing nuclear capability, IRBMs and satellite launching capability.

Naval Capability. Presently, the Chinese navy is essentially for the defence of her homeland. Her offensive capability is generally limited to her submarines. She also has a limited amphibious capability.

- (a) *Naval Fleet.* Organised into three fleets as under :—
 - (i) North Sea Fleet.
 - (ii) East Sea Fleet.
 - (iii) South Sea Fleet.
- (b) *Naval AF.* The Naval AF comprises 30,000 personnel and 600 shore-based aircraft.
- (c) *Nuclear Capability.* China has launched her first nuclear powered submarine but she has yet to develop her SLBMs.

(d) *Expansion Programme.* As is discernable, China has given high priority to the development of submarines and SLBMs. Lately she has also given emphasis to her surface navy.

(e) *Naval Limitations*

(i) *Lack of Bases.* This is a major flaw in her naval power. Except for a political back-head in Tanzania, she has a strategic advantage in Pakistan while she woos Bangladesh and Burma.

(ii) *Character of her Navy.* Her maritime forces presently being of a coastal defence type, her muscle on the high seas is limited.

Chinese Interests in the Indian Ocean

(a) Off-set Russian and American influence on the Eastern flank of the Indian Ocean area; SE Asia.

(b) Break past the Western ring of anti-chinese regimes and seek a foothold in the Indian Ocean area with an eye on facilities in Bangladesh and Pakistan. This would also scuttle Indian influence in the region.

(c) Use her naval power alongwith other means to stop encirclement by nations close to Russia.

Implications for India. There is no doubt that China is trying to acquire a 'blue-water' capability. When she possesses so, it will be her endeavour to sponsor a China-Pak-Bangladesh understanding which will not only scuttle Indian influence in the area but also use her merchant fleet in conjunction with trade across the Korakorum Highway to further her economic and political interests around the Eastern sea-board of Africa and West Asia.

FRANCE

The French Navy maintains a force of 14-20 ships in the Indian Ocean. This constitutes about 10% of her naval ships. The French bases are at Diego Squarez, Reunion and Djibouti. The French interests lie in ensuring the safety of her commerce and sea-lanes in this area; and where possible, minimise Russian influence if it endangers her interests.

JAPAN

Japan is another power which would in the future play a significant role in the politics of the Indian Ocean. It has vital economic interests which she may have to defend at a subsequent date. Further, she has the world's second largest merchant fleet. Presently, Japanese navy is occupied with the protection of her shores and is also constrained in her capability for long range operations. But that is a

political decision. In any case, the ghost of World War II still looms large in SE Asia insofar as Japan is concerned. However, she is vitally concerned in the freedom to navigate through the Straits of Malacca; and this will also bring her at a future date, if the need arises, into Indian Ocean waters.

THE PREVAILING SITUATION

It seems that the Indian Ocean Area is being sought to be filled differently by different powers; and the regional nations appear as sad onlookers at this drama on the high seas. This aspect is further highlighted by the fact that none of the littoral states have the capability to dominate the Ocean themselves nor have the means to prevent the super-powers to do so. The only alternative for these regional countries is to refuse bases and facilities to outside powers. But this is not coming into being on account of foreign political and economic constraints on one hand, and the inability of littoral nations to resolve their differences on the other. This situation is likely to continue well into the 21st century.

INDIA'S SECURITY AND PROBLEMS

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The imperial policy towards India was best summed up by Lord Curzon when he said, ".....he would be a short-sighted commander indeed who merely manned the ramparts in India and did not look beyond". Having the means to implement this policy the British demonstrated a classic strategy by developing bases around the periphery of this Ocean and also controlling the choke-points. They thus maintained an 'oceanic space' between India's coast-line and any aggressor. But after World War-II, the Indian Ocean was no more 'British Lake' it used to be. The 'status-quo' was affected by such factors :—

- (a) India's independence and division of the sub-continent.
- (b) Dissolution of the British Empire and its subsequent withdrawal 'East of Suez'.
- (c) Development of ICBMs and SLBMs which have to an extent rendered the old strategic concepts meaningless.
- (d) The emergence of the Russian Navy on the high seas.
- (e) The importance of oil and the connected sea-routes passing across the Indian Ocean.
- (f) Extension of super-power rivalry in this ocean space.
- (g) India's quest for maritime security needs.

INDIA'S SECURITY NEEDS

India's stakes in the security of the Indian Ocean essentially stem from the safeguarding of any seaward threat to the mainland, her inland territories and commercial interests. In more tangible terms it could be spelt out thus :—

- (a) India juts into the Ocean for a thousand miles. Further, she has to defend 5,700 kms of her coast-line and territories, Occupying such a dominant position, a country the size of India can ill-afford to neglect her maritime frontiers.
- (b) 85% of her trade passes over this Ocean. It is incumbent that her maritime and trade routes are protected. And the maritime trade is increasing.
- (c) Off-shore oil and other mineral assets necessitate her safeguarding her assets.
- (d) The exploitation, specially of marine life in the Exclusive Economic Zone calls for a physical presence not only within the 200 kms limit but also a 'lookout' on the high seas.
- (e) The threats posed by Pakistan and with the acquisition of nuclear submarines; also china.
- (f) The exploitation and extension of super-power rivalry in this region calls for some response from a regional power like India.

The above factors simply backen us to fill out our own in the Indian Ocean. The sooner the better. It is for reasons stated above that neither SE Asia nor Asia in general is considered by India as a vacuum to be filled by outside powers. But can she avoid this?

THE PROBLEM AREAS

The Outside Presence. Mahan's theory of the indivisibility of the seas has never been more valid than it is today. With the advent of high endurance nuclear submarines and task forces backed by fleet trains, the long arm of sea-power has become very long indeed. It would be difficult to prevent a sizeable outside naval activity in the area if all the countries of the region so desired it—an unlikely possibility in itself. A case in point is the super powers line-up of warships at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

The Naval Proxy. It is well on the cards that a super-power may extend its support by proxy to an adversary of India. The US base at Diego Garcia and the interest in the Gwadar base in Pakistan can be to India's disadvantage. Covertly, the US could cause following naval and strategic imbalances :—

- (a) Material assistance from pre-positioned stocks at Diego Garcia or elsewhere in the Gulf.

(b) Move of US ships into main Pakistan ports thereby not only deter any naval offensive but also release enemy ships for more potent tasks in the Indian waters.

(c) Surveillance over Indian naval movements and early warning.

(d) Provide an 'electronic envelope' to the Pak Navy or interfere with India's electronic emissions/communications.

The Oil Embargo. In the event of a war with Pakistan it is likely that Islamic countries may impose an oil embargo and also impound Indian ships in their harbours. What if the 'short war' goes the 'Iran-Iraqi' way!

China's Nuclear Fleet. China has already floated two nuclear powered submarines. Once she has refined her SLBMs, areas which were hitherto uncovered by land based missiles in Tibet will now be exposed to a sea-ward threat. Further, any acquisition of a naval facility in Bangladesh will be deterrent to India's defence and stakes in the Bay of Bengal

Obligations of a Regional Power. In 1971, India rushed aid to help defeat insurgency in Sri Lanka. It is well on the cards that India may be called upon to help or assist her lesser neighbours in their time of need. The navy provides one positive answer to such needs of friendly nations in and around the Indian Ocean. This aspect further assumes importance if India were to deny the political and military influence of outside powers during a crisis.

The Naval Presence. To police, enforce and protect the envisaged laws of the Sea and our assets in the Exclusive Economic Zone a physical and credible naval presence is also required during peace time.

ALTERNATIVES AND INDIA'S ANSWER

ALTERNATIVES

It is obvious that India has a permanent interest in sanitizing its security environment in the Indian Ocean and protecting her being from a sea-ward threat. In quest of this endeavour, some of the options are :—

(a) The acquisition of a powerful navy to counter any external presence in this area. Even if economic constraints are set aside, India, and for that matter none else can individually dominate this Ocean. For India the problem is more acute if she does not control or hold influence at the choke-points of Aden, South Africa, the Suez and Straits of Malacca.

(b) To join in a collective regional defence arrangement. This, because of political and ideological reasons and for India's

unwillingness to undertake a security role outside her borders, may not lend feasibility to such an arrangement.

(c) To declare the Indian Ocean area a zone of peace. This is almost utopian due to rivalry and conflict amongst the countries of the region. This issue is further compounded by extra-regional interests. It is worth noting that the Indian Ocean states have yet to meet to evolve a common policy.

(d) The Indian Ocean states can at least deny in providing bases to super powers. This again is not yet possible due to economic military and political links some states have with super powers for off-setting their own sub-regional imbalances and instability.

(e) To achieve the status of a regional maritime power which would enable India to act towards a power balance in the Indian Ocean area. This requires an expanding self-generative ship-building and aviation industry. This will also impact our national strategic objectives where a balance may have to be struck between our continental outlook and maritime requirements. The ocean management would call for the following four tier maritime force duly backed up by scientific research and industrial outlay :—

(i) A blue water navy consisting of ocean going three dimensional fleets.

(ii) A brown water navy for protection of our coastline, harbours and other assets.

(iii) A coast guard to protect our ocean wealth in the Exclusive Economic Zone.

(iv) An organisation to control and supervise ocean engineering and naval survey.

INDIA GOING NUCLEAR

The question whether India should go nuclear or not is a very popular topic which has been 'tossed' about quite a bit. Suffice it say, that with China acquiring a land and also a naval nuclear capability, and Pakistan at the thresh-hold of her maiden explosion, India has very little choice but to go nuclear. The safest place to put away the warheads would be in SLBMs. Any indecision on this count would be at the peril of our national security. With nuclear submarines we can deliver on to or deter our adversaries.

INDIA'S ANSWER

While regional co-operation is of undoubted importance it cannot be called a total answer to India's security needs and position. The implications for India are clear—she must work towards a 'power balance' and simultaneously build up the four tier postulated maritime posture.

Some may contend that military strength is of little value if it is achieved at the cost of economic health. But by the same token defence and security of a nation is more important than opulence.

Coupled with the launching of the four tier maritime force, thrust must also continue in acquiring nuclear submarines and SLBMs. India can ill-afford to be indecisive on this issue. Whilst building up her own muscle, India must continue to strive in promoting a spirit of bilateralism and the concept of an Indian Ocean Common Market. At the same time she must also allay the fear of a big and powerful India in the eyes of regional states. Towards China and Pakistan, India must, however, match their capability and in fact deter any naval ventures by them in the Indian Ocean area. In case of the two super-powers, India should be an important equation whose regional aspirations of peace and prosperity must be respected. For this India will have to be militarily and economically strong. These then are India's answers to the power struggle in the Indian Ocean. It be remembered again "who so ever controls the Indian Ocean has India at its mercy". We cannot afford another letup.

CONCLUSION

The Indian Ocean is the ocean of the future, an ocean of destiny. To it is hitched India's security and well-being. The intra-regional dimensions and interests have helped fan local conflict and regional imbalances. Resultant is a neo-exploitation of the Indian Ocean area. India cannot afford to be wayward as she was. Any subjugation again will make her miss the 'third industrial revolution' sweeping the globe. She cannot afford to miss it. Her size, position and needs call out for a power balance that will enable India to fill her own in the Indian Ocean. She cannot stop super-power intrusion but she cannot remain mute to it. For this she must embark on the postulated four tier maritime posture which will not only enable her to defend her shores and maritime wealth, but also place her at the head of the region where her position is respected for the peace and prosperity she will offer. This then is India's answer to the power struggle in the Indian Ocean area.

Future Terrorism : Threats and Security

DR V K ANAND*

MOSCOW already feels that the abortive attempt made on the life of US President Reagan on March 30, 1981 could have triggered off a nuclear war because, immediately after the shooting, Pentagon is alleged to have informed the commanders that Reagan had been attacked by the Russian terrorists and that war was inevitable.

With the finances, sophistication and transnational relations of the terrorists improving, it may be difficult to discount the possibility of a rebel, sadist or an imbecile acquiring control over an atomic weapon, laser beam 'death ray', 'a killer satellite' or an 'invisible plane'. Then it should not be difficult to threaten from space the existence of a metropolitan city, industrial complex, nuclear installation, super power plant, river dam, or a leader of great eminence. Should the monstrous 'gamma weapon' requiring just a quintal of Uranium 235 fall into the terrorists' hands, its silent detonation could wipe out all living matter in a 1,000 kilometre square area in no time.

DEVASTATING EFFECTS

The horrors of future terrorism can be appreciated by visualising the impact of just a single nuclear explosion of a 3 megaton bomb to carry the equivalent TNT of which some 300,000 ten-ton lorries would be required. If detonated at ground level, in a densely packed city like Calcutta, it could kill within a few minutes about five million people. Within five kilometres of the burst point almost all living bodies and the structures will be so destroyed by the primary and secondary heat and blast effects of the over 1000,000 C temperature of the fireball generated, as to obliterate all signs of civilization.

While everything within five to ten kilometres will be burnt or scorched to rubble, no sign of life would be left upto 15 kilometres even of those living in shelters. Those who survive within 15 to 25 kilometres would not be able to last longer than a fortnight because the immediate and appropriate help required at a gigantic scale would be almost impossible to mobilise. While some out of those who

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happen to observe the explosion with their naked eyes may lose their vision permanently on account of the sudden flash which would be many times stronger than the noon sun, the many who survive within 25 to 50 kilometre distance will be so incapacitated as to envy the dead.

Depending on the geographical attributes like the proximity of rain catchment areas, rivers, water reservoirs, irrigation areas and above all the wind direction, thousands of square kilometres of fertile land could be rendered uninhabitable for many generations to come even including those of the neighbouring countries by the residual radiation and the later radio active fallout.

Leave aside the sick and the disabled, the grotesque forms of human progeny may continue to be born for many years to come, as witnessed in Hiroshima.

The electromagnetic radiation produced could damage or corrupt electronic devices like radios, TVs, radars and computers because of insulation failures, fusion and relay trappings. And the change in the electrical conductivity of the atmosphere could severely disrupt the high, medium and low frequency communications. As a result, the distorted data outputs could cause erratic commands leading to unexpected retaliation and an unmanageable catastrophe.

Naturally, the question as to how any terrorist could acquire such a nuclear device needs to be answered before investing him with the power to blackmail or devastate a vast area.

ACQUISITION MEANS

The nuclear science and technology has so proliferated and become such a common place that some governments, revolutionary organisations, radical groups and even a few affluent and influential criminals may be able to procure the nuclear kits from one or more motivated advanced nations, patron organisations or sympathetic agencies for the manufacture of rudimentary bombs. Israel and South Africa could help a terrorist group to improve their own security environment, Cuba to safeguard its ideology, Pakistan to acquire the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, Japan to barter with raw materials like uranium and oil, the Palestinians to take revenge against Israel and Libya to spread the cause of Islam.

Alternatively some terrorists could employ mercenary nuclear technicians or buy the nuclear materials, designs and components to manufacture a device *ab initio* or an already worked up stage.

Many scientists feel that the know how and skills required for fabricating a crude atomic bomb are not more than that needed for the illicit manufacture of a variety of drugs. Some however, maintain that a few of the terrorist groups like those of the IRA could be already in the know of things, adequate enough to produce a bomb. Such views are not misplaced considering that in 1975 a 20 year old student of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, depending entirely on published information, was able to produce a workable design of an atomic bomb.

In view of the fact that just about eight kilograms of plutonium kept separately in two parts has to be brought together with certain energy, a nuclear scientist explained that "If a solution of plutonium nitrate was dried, packed as crystals into two stainless steel mixing bowls and surrounded by ordinary blocks of TNT, nuclear explosion would probably occur if the critical mass of the nitrate when imploded had been properly calculated."

A tie up between different terrorist organisations at various levels resulting in pooling up of their knowhow, research facilities and natural and developed resources could also be helpful. Besides, the possibility of discovering misplaced or lost nuclear devices or materials or stealing from the nuclear arsenals or diverting from governmental or private nuclear industrial concerns with the cooperation of officers, clandestinely or at black market rates cannot be discounted. When security is weak, nuclear weapons, components or materials could be looted by organizing thefts, raids and ambushes and subsequently used for black mailing, demanding ransom and even resale for some consideration.

The security agencies could also be infiltrated for collaborating in 'disappearances' of nuclear weapons. Or, what is worse, may happen if some 'agitators' during a bout of 'civil resistance', 'dissidents' during an abortive 'coup' or 'revolutionaries' during a 'revolution' or 'counter-revolution' could come to establish short lived control over the nuclear arsenals. The transitional powerlords could then resort to nuclear terrorism against the state's incumbent political authority, or rival group or an external power or organisation. They could even arrange to gift, sell or barter one or more nuclear weapons if opportune.

During a civil war or a mass movement unleashed by certain population groups, as witnessed in the erstwhile East Pakistan, some nuclear weapons could pass into the hands of opponents to lay the foundation of nuclear terrorism or attract pre-emptive nuclear strikes

from the authorities or neighbouring countries already in possession of nuclear weapons.

SOME SCENARIOS

Even without possessing nuclear weapons, the terrorists could cause the radiation effects of an atomic explosion by destroying nuclear processing projects, atomic power plants or nuclear powered ships with the help of conventional explosions, bombardment or sabotage in their functioning. Such a fear is not misplaced considering that in the year 1979 alone the American nuclear power stations suffered more than 2,300 incidents stemming from both technical faults and human errors which could cover many future subterfuge. Further, even small amounts of plutonium released in crowded areas could be so sinister as to cause certain deadly varieties of cancer.

That the terrorists have so far not adopted much simpler and quite abnoxious options available in the hand book of chemical and biological warfare is no guarantee against the exploitation of nuclear techniques.

To depict a scenario, the Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir could launch its forces to liberate the Jammu and Kashmir portion integrated with India. Any retaliation by India against other parts of Pakistan could be threatened with the explosion of a nuclear bomb in Delhi or the bordering north Indian Bhakra Dam. Any agreement between India and Pakistan being arrived at on the future of Jammu and Kashmir which is not to the liking of an organisation having control over one or more nuclear weapons could be wrecked in a similar way.

A nuclear bomb in the possession of Pakthoons could well encourage them to terrorise the Pakistani authorities in granting independence to the tribesmen. Similarly, some of the revolutionary organisations and groups of India after coming into possession of nuclear weapons could not only terrorise the authorities but also the neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in case safe havens, if sought, are denied to them. The Sri Lankan Tamil terrorists, if equipped with nuclear weapons, could threaten to destroy a number of Indian cities if India provided aid to Sri Lankan government or refused to assist the terrorist organisation or denied the repatriation of Sri Lankan Tamils to India.

Such scenarios are indeed disturbing but not unrealistic to imagine considering that certain Palestinian terrorists made an attempt,

though abortive, in 1976, to smuggle out of Kenya a dismantled SAM-7—a hand operated Russian missile for knocking off an El Al plane—just three years after some Arab terrorists had failed to take out of Rome a heat seeking rocket. It is now quite possible that a single individual operated missile guided by infra red devices and transportable in a private automobile could be moved to a position of advantage for firing at a valuable target, be it an aircraft, ship, train or the residence of powerful antagonist.

Such possibilities are not mere conjectures considering the findings of a UNO study which reveals that the nuclear weapons whose number today may be anywhere around 40,000 to 50,000 have the combined explosive power that is more than one million Hiroshima bombs, which is equivalent to 13 billion tons of TNT.

The nuclear terrorism is distinctly different from the acts of conventional war, because, besides the over 100,000 deaths which even the nuclear explosion of lowest yield is likely to cause in a major city, the maximum suffering and devastation is likely to be borne by the civil populated areas and, therefore, is a cause for grave concern.

SUSPECTED USE

While admittedly, stealing, buying, procuring, or manufacturing a nuclear device is no easy task even for governments, yet small groups of terrorists could easily arrange certain lethal chemical or biological agents, the release of which on the land, in the air or through the community drinking water sources could cause immense loss of life.

Believing that the Russians, either through their own agents or the indigenous troops, had resorted to the use of chemical and toxin weapons, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, the USA after having been itself accused of causing 'yellow rain' attacks in Vietnam is reported to have already laid down the groundwork for the production of a new nerve gas.

The alleged Israeli chemical warfare against the Palestinians in the West Bank city of Jenin in March 1983 is believed to have been responsible for the hospitalisation of 600 new cases including women and children of all ages, in one day alone.

The latest report comes from three unidentified British doctors who alleged in an international medical conference at Teheran that between November 9 and 19, 1983, the Iraqi troops had used chemical

weapons and poisonous gasses near Penjwin, 320 kilometres north of Baghdad and as a result of which some 34 Iranians were reportedly injured and transferred to Tarfa hospital in Teheran. Such developments are likely to provide new but abhorrent materials to the terrorists.

That so far no terrorist has seriously relied on either chemical or biological weapons, in spite of the fact that poisoning of enemy wells is as old as tribal warfare, there is no guarantee that the modern terrorist will continue to demonstrate similar indifference in the future, particularly in the field of chemical weapons.

Possibly, the over 2,500 deaths of innocent people caused in Bhopal in December 1984 were due to human error, negligence or mechanical failure. But the very thought that similar or worse effects could be produced through sabotage is bone chilling.

The reported contamination of the sources of drinking water in Kabul after the arrival of Soviet forces, whether by the nationalist insurgents or the Russian agents, resulting in the poisoning of hundreds of Afghani students may be a pointer for the emerging trends in terrorism.

PREVENTION DIFFICULTIES

If dealing with the explosive devices and the hijacked planes is difficult, it would be a fallacy to imagine that any effective measure can be taken against the future generation of terrorists who may well be equipped with the horrifying atomic, chemical and biological weapons to make their threats more abominable and demands less practicable to meet. Therefore, while reliance for survival against such new forms of terrorism may have to be placed mostly in the institutional arrangements, it may still be possible to initiate some measures at individual level if equipped with certain basic information.

It may be recalled that for the 113 persons including 81 children, killed and some 273,400 afflicted by the dengue outbreak in Cuba, President Castro in mid 1981 accused the USA of engaging in bacteriological terrorism. He strongly suspected that the plague that had seriously harmed the Island's sugar and tobacco crops and also its cattle herds had too been introduced by the American CIA.

Biological terrorism could be created more seriously by threatening to release certain types of fungi, bacteria, or virus which could cause coccidiomycosis, cholera or dengue fever to lay off an entire population within two days to three weeks, particularly at a time when the people are facing an emergency. Against this even such

authorities as meticulously and frequently test large air samples at numerous places may appear helpless. Because by the time the biological agents are detected, warning signals issued and remedial measures taken by the people, the malady could have already progressed considerably. Even if immunisation or prophylactic treatment is possible against the specific agents identified, how could any agency produce almost overnight the wide range and massive quantities of medicines required?

ADVANCE WARNING

In a startling disclosure regarding the use of chemical agents, the US health secretary, Richard Schweiker recently admitted that at least 90 chemical spraying missions in Vietnam had to be aborted and the cargo dumped because of engine failure or enemy action. He conceded that in 41 cases, the 'Agent Orange' may have been jettisoned on the American troops or installations. However, against the chemical agents, the individuals aided by the authorities can take certain protective measures.

Most people are perhaps familiar with the CS and CR agents, and many in Delhi, the world's capital of demonstrations, may have experienced their types. Because of their ability to irritate the eyes and respiratory system without causing any permanent damage, they are generally used to temporarily incapacitate unruly mobs.

While adamsite causes vomiting, hydrogen cyanide adversely affects the affected person's oxygen intake. Among various other agents, chlorine and phosgene impair respiration and cause choking. While the mustard gas, though damaging and persistent but non-lethal, can cause troublesome blisters, the nerve agents based on phosphorus being quick acting and lethal can cause muscular malfunctioning and even paralysis.

As chemical terrorism is likely to be restricted to small areas and will be rapid acting, the first and immediate aids required would be respirators, protective suits, long boots and hand gloves. Since whatever dress one may be already wearing will provide some protection, a respirator with mask will be of critical value. Also the people must have detection papers or residual vapour detectors which on changing their colour in accordance with the chemical agent present in the air, will indicate the need for continuing the precautions only for as long as the chemical effect lasts.

However, in an atmosphere of chemical terrorism, if the effects of nerve agents are felt, immediate injection of atropine or regular consumption of oximes will provide the prophylactic treatment.

But to make such commodities available in reasonable quantities and in time, research, development and production schedules will have to be initiated by the authorities, chambers of industries and pharmaceutical companies well in advance.

Countries fearing chemical terrorism can contrive some advance warning systems as well, like the Nerve Agent Immobilised Enzyme Alarm and Detector adopted in the UK and the USA, which can give adequate preparatory time to the people.

However, the threat posed by the biological and chemical agents recedes into background when the holocaust that a megaton or even a smaller nuclear explosion can cause, is imagined.

The fear that one wrong step could trigger off all the 50,000 or so nuclear warheads of the world, unleashing a TNT equivalent of 3 tons per human being—man, woman and child—may make any effort for survival look ridiculous. But the instinct for self preservation will perhaps keep on goading man to continue with survival efforts.

SHELTER COSTS

In Soviet Russia, besides the training, instructions and refresher courses for civil defence against nuclear attacks to which all sections of society—right from school children to factory labourer—are exposed, almost the entire population has been provided with varying degrees of protection. Though the exact figures are difficult to obtain, it is believed that with the 5 per cent of their defence budget earmarked for civil defence, by 1982, they had been able to provide shelters for about three-fourth of their population.

In Sweden also every city has been provided with some sort of security. With public and private shelters catering for about half the population, i.e., 4 million, the government has plans to move out of the urban areas about 4 million people, 700,000 alone out of the Stockholm's 170,0000 million, into safer rural areas, hopefully well before a nuclear threat.

With shelters constructed for 85 per cent of Helsinki's population and three-fourth of the people living in the likely target areas, an overall 60 per cent of Finland's population, has been assured of protection.

While over half of Norway's population has been provided with shelters, the figure of those protected is expected to go up to 30 per cent by end eighties in West Germany.

In addition to Israel, other countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria and Saudi Arabia are also making some progress in this direction.

Considerable headway has been made in China where extensive trenching and shelters have been made to protect some sections of population. Beijing's entire population, upto the last man, will just take about seven minutes to go into the endless masonry and concrete tunnels about eight metres below through the numerous entrances leading out of every bungalow, flat, office and shop to emerge out into safety 32 kilometers away. Most of the other cities are also believed to have been provided with similar shelters.

In spite of their vast population and less advanced technology and economy, such shelters provided with water, food, cooking, medical and sewage facilities, do not appear as rudimentary or insignificant even when compared with the sophisticated and wholesome endeavour of Switzerland which is already able to provide nuclear protection to 90 per cent of its 6.5 million population. By the end of this decade, their entire population can hope for sheltered space supported by a total of 1,000 hospitals and first aid posts with 72,400 beds.

On these constructions, known as civil defence works, an average of \$100 million, which is 5.3 per cent of the country's defence budget and comes to \$15 per head, is being spent. A matching investment is being made by its cantons and communities. And to encourage those who build their own private shelters, the government grants a 50 per cent subsidy.

Compared to the \$50 billion expenditure of the USSR on civil defence during the 1970's the Americans spent just one billion. The current one dollar per head expenditure in the USA is one-fourth of the corresponding figure in Denmark, Finland and FRG, one-tenth of that of Norway and one-fifteenth of that in Switzerland.

AMBITIOUS SWITZERLAND

Civil defence service, being compulsory in Switzerland, except for women volunteers, employs all the able bodied men between the

age of 20 and 60 years who are not drafted for military duty. Its present total force of 25,000 is expected to go upto 62,500 in due course.

This Swiss programme evoked such interest, particularly in Europe, that over 1,000 enquiries were received by the federal office of civil defence in just six months. "Swamped with the requests from foreign authorities and private firms," the organisation commenced a series of two-day seminars, the first six being attended by well over 200 people. As a result, over half a dozen shelter construction companies have sprung up in London alone, perhaps for overseas operations in the rich Middle East. For, at a conservatively estimated rate of £ 200 a shelter prevailing during the late 1970s, the total cost of protecting the entire population of London was expected to be £ 1,600 million, i.e., about one-eight of the annual British defence budget.

One five-hectare military shelter in the Chiltern Hills is alone going to cost £ 300 million. For the utter lack of planning and action for survival against nuclear holocaust, particularly when compared with the Swiss Law demanding shelter for every human being, the over confidence of the UK is only matched by the helplessness of India.

This most ambitious programme of early warning communication network, shelters and support systems launched in Switzerland is expected to withstand the blast and heat effects of any nuclear explosion except the direct hits and provide complete protection from all types of harmful radiation. To achieve this high standard, chemical toilets have been made and food supplies, at present being kept to last for three days, will eventually be provisioned for the entire 14 days nuclear fall-out period during which the people are expected to stay inside the underground shelters—public or private. For action during an emergency, each household shelter has been provided with a 315 page civil defence book containing exhaustive information on the subject.

Compared to this greatest institutional venture to organise complete protection for all the citizens of Switzerland, The Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe hopes to provide by 1983 a 20 metre deep concrete shelter to house the NATO headquarters in Europe with all the paraphernalia of electronic command, data processing and communications systems. Covering an area of

about 6,000 square metres, the shell and three metre thick slab made of reinforced cement concrete, expected to cost \$ 100 million on completion, is designed to "stand upto any weapon" including nuclear.

Since, for various obvious reasons, such elaborate arrangements cannot be provided everywhere, efforts may be made to prepare trenches and bunkers with overhead covers and to get into them when a nuclear attack appears likely. The electronic devices can also be fairly protected by using electronic filters, avoiding loops and reducing leads, if not already so designed. However, in case one is caught in the open, the only protection against the nuclear blast, heat and radiation lies in throwing oneself flat facing the ground and away from the flash with hands underneath.

Pak Designs Against India

WG CDR KS TRIPATHI (RETD)

IF in the internal affairs of Pakistan, the execution of Mr Bhutto was a great relief to President Zia, the felling of Mrs Indira Gandhi, the creator of the breakaway Bangladesh and the captor of 90000 Pak troops, at the hands of assassins, was a good riddance for him of a dominating figure in the external affairs. The sense of comfort was all the greater because in weeks preceding her assassination, she tirelessly warned her countrymen of the dangers posed to India by Pakistan's acquisition of sophisticated and futuristic weapon systems. Even if some of her warnings are dismissed as election rhetoric, coming as they did as a preamble to declaring the Lok Sabha elections, it would be hard for any analyst to read in those warnings signs of political expediency only.

Will Pakistan attack India once more and what if with its sophisticated weapons procured from the United States it indeed did, for didn't it attack India in the past liberally using foreign weapons, solemn promises to the contrary of its American friends notwithstanding? With Mrs Gandhi gone and the new leadership yet to acquire her confidence, it may be an opportune time for President Zia to tilt the geo-political balance in the sub-continent in his favour. Or is Zia too shrewd and intelligent a person to ignore the lessons of 1947, 1965 and 1971 and can he be depended upon to confine his activities to propaganda for extracting the maximum benefit from his indulgent foreign friends to match the might of India in a security environment where Pakistan's value as a strategically located country continues to appreciate? Or would he follow the middle path, encouraging secessionists, sending infiltrators and generally destabilising India to emerge as the arbiter of the destiny of the Sub-continent, at least as long as the going is good.

The answer to these questions is both simple and difficult. It is simple because the birth, history and the ethos of Pakistan are oriented to a hate-India culture, occasionally expressed in naked aggression, no matter howsoever self-defeating such aggressions turned out to be. It would, therefore, not be a surprise if the Pakistani rulers once more launched an attack on India succumbing to

their compulsive hatred of India, fuelled in recent years by the acquisition of a vast range of new generation of weapons. It is difficult because a war is a war and a decision to mount an attack is fraught with grave consequences and no one in his senses would opt for such a course merely because he didn't like a neighbour. No matter how intense the hatred, the options are limited and the dangers of the gamble failing chilling as indeed, Ayub and Yahya belatedly realised to their great frustration. Zia may, therefore, follow a safer course and attempt to create insurmountable problems for the Indian leadership by cashing on the regional, social, linguistic and religious tensions in India.

PATHOLOGICAL HATRED OF INDIA

The genesis of Pakistan is in the hate-Hindu psyche. It is a psyche which defies understanding. It may not manifest at an individual's level. A Pakistani, left to himself, may be warm and amiable to the Hindus, for ethnically and culturally he might well belong to the same stock and despite his conversion to a different religion, he may still have some Hindu customs. However, since the days of Mr Jinnah he has been systematically brainwashed to consider himself not only different from the Hindus but also to hate them. The very basis of Pakistan being the hatred of the Hindus, later extended to India as a whole, it was inconceivable for any Pakistani ruler, whether an elected representative of his people or a military dictator to sustain himself or Pakistan without stirring the anti-India feelings among his people. The stronger the hate-India feeling among the Pakistanis, the greater were the chances of the ruler sticking to power. The popularity of the Pakistani ruler was directly in proportion to the anti-India feeling he was able to churn. Pakistani nationalism came to be synonymous with the hate-India feeling.

Several other factors aggravated this psychosis. Apart from the personal rivalry against Pandit Nehru, which Jinnah typified and which he transformed at the national level, the political courses the two countries adopted, the foreign policies they formulated, the geo-political perceptions they visualised, the strategic roles they found themselves cast in and the industrial, socio-religious and military structures they built up—all contributed to Pakistan's growing uneasiness against its neighbour. In addition, the Pakistani leaders found it profitable to continue flogging the dead horse of the so-called Kashmir problem and never missed an opportunity to embarrass India in international and regional forums. Having largely eliminated their own minority problems, either by forcible conversion, suppression or

eviction, the Pakistani rulers also posed as self-appointed guardians of the Indian Muslims. Taking advantage of the inevitable social tensions of a free pluralistic society that India is, the Pakistani rulers stamped their feet, more spectacularly than with any genuine concern, at every Hindu-Muslim riot in India to raise dark clouds of propaganda dust, conveniently ignoring their own Shia-Sunni riots and the barbaric treatment meted out to the Ahmedias, who ironically gave them Zafarullah Khan, who tirelessly fought Pakistani battles for Kashmir in the United Nations.

The political vicissitudes through which Pakistan has passed, the long spells of military rule to which it has been subjected, the secessionist tendencies in Sind and Baluchistan triggered by the atrocities of the dominant Punjabi group and the repressive and tyrannical methods of its government have stunted the growth of Pakistan as a nation. In contrast, India, despite the wars forced on it by Pakistan and trouble formented by it in various parts of the country, especially in the Punjab, culminating in the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi, has had a stable form of government where people have had the freedom to elect the type of representatives they thought best to rule them. The steady growth of industry, science and technology, agriculture, including space and nuclear technology and defence production and social and political systems marked out India as a model of the developing countries. This is deeply disliked by Pakistan. Ayub spoke contemptuously of the Dhотиwalas and Bhutto spoke of Indian dogs and of 1000 years of war against India. How, indeed, can the Dhотиwallas, the kafirs, march ahead to greater prosperity and advancement, successfully fight wars against Pakistan and repel its aggression and enjoy greater international respectability than "pure" Muslims of Pakistan is a question, which baffles the Pakistanis.

Suffering from a deep-rooted inferiority complex and haunted by Indo-phobia, the Pakistani leaders become paranoiac in their perceptions about India. Born out of hatred against India, Pakistan cannot obliterate the very *raison d'être* of its birth and therefore, it has become essential for its very existence to keep the Indian bogey alive. Friendship with India would be an embrace of death, a national suicide, for it would tantamount to confessing the defeat of the two nation theory on which Jinnah founded the theocratic State of Pakistan and which provides, in howsoever moth-eaten a manner after the birth of Bangladesh, a rationale and a politico-religious framework for Pakistan. Some Indian analysts fail to comprehend this

basic factor and gullibly talk of accepting the no-war pact proposals of Zia, little realising that all that Zia is aiming at is just to throw a spanner to confuse the Indian Policy-makers. The Simla Pact provides a basis for bilateral discussion on all outstanding problems without resort to arms but Pakistan continues indefatigably to needle India by raising the Kashmir issue at every forum. Pakistan may attempt luring India into accepting its outer benigning mask only to launch an attack on India even before the ink on the no-war pact had dried. In any case, it would be a perilous folly for India to mistake the diplomatic niceties of Zia, or for that matter of any other Pakistani ruler, for a sincere offer of friendship.

It is not to suggest that India must behave belligerently, lose diplomatic initiative to Pakistan and appear to the international community as a recalcitrant intractably hostile neighbour out to destroy Pakistan at the slightest whip of the wind. India must expose the hollowness of the Pakistani offers of peace and the designs of its rulers.

ARAB CONNECTION : INDIA A MINUS FACTOR

Apart from the imperatives of keeping the India bogey alive for its very existence, there are several other reasons why friendship with India is detrimental to the Pakistani rulers if not to the people of Pakistan at large. Suffering from a complex that the people of Pakistan are largely converts from the Hindus and therefore, likely to be treated as second class Muslims by the Arabs, the Pakistani rulers bend uncomfortably backwards to prove that they are as good Muslims as the Arabs. This accounts for the rigid posture of fundamentalism adopted invariably by all Pakistani rulers, starting from the founder of Pakistan himself. By his education and upbringing Mr Jinnah was in fact, a liberal but he found it expedient and necessary to put a mask of a die-hard Muslim and he lived upto his mask with a rare show of rigidity and determination succeeding eventually in carving out an independent State for his followers, no matter if geographically it was a monstrous creation, divided in two widely separated Parts, which history took nearly a quarter of a century to undo. What Jinnah gained through a show of bigotry towards the Hindus and India, his successors cannot throw away by a display of liberalism, because besides hoping to earn some respectability from the Arab world in particular and the Muslim world in general, they gain two more important points—one, easy flow of petrodollars from the Arab world and the second, the image of good Muslims setting an example to, and creating a complex for, the Indian Muslims, whose interests they self-appointedly seem to represent.

Both tactically for his own survival and strategically for getting greater aid from the Arab and the Western world for Pakistan's economic and military development, a Pakistani ruler would place India very low on his list of friends, for there is little for him to gain from India except benefits of such trade and commerce as may be promoted without affecting his image as a India-hater. A state of confrontation with India suits him admirably for he can cash on such a situation to appeal to his Arab friends for greater aid against a non-Muslim neighbour out to destroy him. It is imperative for India's economic development that there is peace in the Sub-continent. Apart from the need for growth, India is passionately devoted to such a cause as a national philosophy coming down from the days of the Buddha. Pakistan must however, paint India as an aggressor, potential or actual, and if possible, manipulate a few border skirmishes for crying wolf to attract the attention of its benefactors.

To an extent the Arab world, threatened by Israel, found a certain strategic symmetry in Pakistan's growth as a modern well-armed, nuclear Muslim State, eager to undertake some pioneering nuclear and military R & D on their behalf too. Inheriting from pre-partition India an educated elite and a scientific base, Pakistan offered to the Arab world an ideal Muslim State which was to be helped to develop its armed forces, including nuclear weaponry as a kind a military bank on which the Arab world could cash on in times of need against Israel. To this symmetry, Pakistan shrewdly added the dimension of a threat to its own existence from a non-Muslim neighbour. This enables Pakistan to get generous monetary aid from the Arab world for procuring ultra-sophisticated weapons from the United States. Pakistan also offers the services of its pilots and other military personnel to fly sophisticated aircraft and to man the ultra-modern weapons in the Arab countries. In an emergency not only the Pakistani pilots and personnel can be withdrawn from these countries to be redeployed against India, but if Pakistan is able to shed sufficient crocodile tears convincing the Arab world of its disintegration in the face of Indian troops, it might even enjoy the benefit of Arab aircraft and armament.

The Arab world may not have had much stake in Pakistan when Bangladesh chose to tear itself apart from the unnatural union with Islamabad but it would be difficult to visualise a situation where the Arab world, which has several common defence R & D and economic projects with Pakistan, would turn a Nelson's eye if Pakistan gets a serious drubbing from India in any future confrontation between the

two. The Arab countries may not directly confront India but that the flow of arms, equipment, fund and even trained personnel to work behind the lines would be generous is a probability India cannot rule out, its warm friendly relations with the Arab world notwithstanding.

PHENOMENAL PAK MILITARY BUILD-UP

The recent years have witnessed a gigantic military build up in Pakistan. Since the creation of Bangladesh and Pakistan's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indian troops in 1971, the Pakistan Government has embarked on a course of militarisation far beyond its requirements both present and foreseeable.

The defence expenditure of Pakistan is almost three times that of India in per capita terms and more than double in terms of percentage of gross national product (GNP). Even in terms of percentage of total government expenditure, Pakistan is spending a staggering 45.6% on defence compared to India's 27.6%. This expenditure is the 4th highest in the world. Pakistan's per capita defence expenditure is \$21 as against India's \$8 and it spends 7.1% of its GNP on defence as against 3.3% spent by India (Military Balance 1984-85, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS London). Considering the fact that Pakistan receives huge quantities of armament at a price much lower than the actual cost from the United States and China, the real cost of armament being procured by Pakistan would run into several billion dollars, further widening the disparity of defence expenditure between India and Pakistan and making the comparative figures of the two countries, as given by the Military Balance, meaningless. Besides, the Pakistan military budget is not a capital budget but a revenue budget in that it does not show expenditure on military air fields, ports and strategic high-ways, for which funds are provided separately or which are constructed with generous aids from the United States, Arab countries and China. Another significant fact is that Pakistan has a much smaller territory to defend and much smaller numbers of people in military uniform and yet its outlays on defence are much higher than warranted.

Pakistan has considerably augmented its defence forces since East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Pakistan's Armed Forces stood at 4,78,600 in 1982-83 and its para-military forces were estimated at 1,09,100 comprising 22,000 National guards, 65,000 Frontier Corps, 15,000 Pakistan Rangers, 2,000 Coast Guards and 5,100 frontier Constabulary (IISS). 30,000 of Pakistan's troops are serving in foreign countries on contract. The bulk of these forces consisting 20,000 troops are employed in Saudi Arabia and the rest in Jordan, Libya, Yemen and United Arab Emirates.

Pakistan has recently acquired the ultra sophisticated American F 16 fighters, anti-tank weapons and artillery and the Chinese Q5 fighters. It plans to acquire 4 squadrons of F 16s of which 25 F 16s have already been received along with their full complement of the lethal AIM-7 Sparrow missiles and other armament. According to some reports Pakistan's present orders are for 28 F 16s and 14 Chinese Q 5 ground attack fighters. The strength of Pakistan Air Force is going up significantly year after year. It has now 314 combat aircraft compared to 259 in 1983. It now possesses 9 fighter Squadrons as against 6 in 1983. With the addition of 28 F 16s and 14 Chinese Q 5s, the strength of the fighter Squadrons of Pakistan would go up to 13 in 1985-86.

In the past when Pakistan was burdened with the task of defending both the Eastern and Western wings and when its armed forces were much smaller than what they are today, it mounted three attacks on India. In each case the attack was preceded by large numbers of infiltrators sent to this country for sabotage and for marking out sensitive areas and vital defence installations. Today when it has only one compact territory to defend and when its defence forces have become alarmingly formidable and are armed with ultra-modern weapons, it is not difficult to visualise a situation where Pakistan could resort to another attack against India. A fairly large number of Pakistanis are known to be masquerading as Sikh extremists and there are reports of Pakistani infiltrators operating in J & K, Rajasthan and Gujrat.

US-PAK SECURITY TIE

To make matters worse for India, the United States of America has been indiscriminately arming Pakistan since the days of Eisenhower and Dulles. Piqued not only at India's refusal to toe its line, but also at undauntedly proceeding to chart out an independent course and playing a key role in formulating the policy of non-alignment and championing its cause, the United States decided to cultivate a willing Pakistan both as a counterpoise for arresting the growing influence of India in international affairs and as a bulwark for containing the spread of communism as spearheaded by the Soviet Union. The United States military analysts found Pakistan so strategically situated that it could be utilised as a forward observation post for surveillance on the Soviet Union, China India and the Gulf countries. The rulers of Pakistan found the situation admirably suited to their own interests both for rivalling the influence of India in the international field and, more pertinently, for safeguarding their personal position internally.

Tactically and strategically the Pakistani rulers found the American desire for cultivating them a god-sent mana. Pakistan became an invaluable and trusted ally of the United States and a front runner in upholding its global military interests. Both, the State Department and the Pentagon vied with each other in befriending Pakistan and fulfilling the desires of the Pakistani rulers.

The friendship between the two countries culminated in a formal 6-year agreement signed in 1981 under which the United States made a commitment for supplying military assistance and economic aid to Pakistan covering a wide spectrum of military and non-military items valued at \$ 3.26 billion at 1981 prices, which by 1987, when the current agreement expires would be worth much more. Worried about the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the United States felt that it was imperative to equip Pakistan with a modern air defence system for keeping surveillance on the air activity in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The U.S., therefore, decided to build an ultra-modern air defence system in Pakistan and to supply it not only with the highly sophisticated F16 aircraft but also with associated infra-structure for their efficient operation. The U.S. has already supplied Pakistan AN/TPS-43 high frequency radars which form part of the newly established integrated Pakistani air defence Command and Control System. This system uses sophisticated computers and electronic gadgets and makes the Pakistani air space almost inviolable.

The threat to India has been enormously heightened by the American decision to supply four E-2C Hawkeye aircraft to Pakistan. The Hawkeye is a modified jet transport aircraft which carries a 7.30 metre saucer-typed dome on its back, comprising a most sophisticated radar system, which can spot any aircraft at a distance of 334 kilometres. Flying at an altitude of 30,000 feet within the Pak borders, the Hawkeye can pick up all air activity in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Delhi, Haryana, parts of UP, Rajasthan and Gujrat. If it succeeds in intruding into the Indian territory, its range would cover a much wider area. It would be able to direct the F-16s and other Pak interceptors to attack the Indian aircraft, even before they had time to gain combat altitude. The AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles with which the Pak F-16s are currently armed are lethal weapons which can hit their targets with deadly accuracy. Pakistan has already requested the U.S. Government to supply it with the ultra sophisticated AIM-9L air to air missiles for the F-16s and once these are fitted, the F-16s would be able to achieve air superiority in any aerial combat to the great disadvantage of India.

What a great multiplier of air advantage the E-2C Hawkeye could be is clear from the aerial combat fought a few years back over the Beekaa valley in Lebanon, where the Israelis shot down 85 of the Syrian aircraft with the loss of just one of their own aircraft. The F-16s, fitted with the super-modern AIM-9L missiles and fed with the information by the E-2C Hawkeye about the Indian aircraft, just taking to air, would spell doom to the Indian fighter-bombers and this is what must worry all those who are concerned with the defence of India.

Not content with the supply of lethal "top of the line" weapon systems to Pakistan, the United States is providing intelligence data about India to Pakistan collected through its spy Satellites. Although this was feared to be happening for quite some time, it was painfully driven home only recently when the United States passed on cooked up "information" to Pakistan to the effect that its Satellite Tracking Stations did not notice the two Indian Jagaur bomber Squadrons at their usual site and that obviously they had moved up closer to the Pak borders for a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear station at Kahuta. This was baseless inference due probably to cloud formations over the Jagaur sites. Whether the information passed on to Pakistan about the deployment of the Indian aircraft was a routine exchange of intelligence data about India between the United States and Pakistan or the United States was seeking an alibi for supplying futuristic weapon systems to Pakistan under this scare story to muffle Senatorial criticism, particularly from Senator, Alan Cranston, is immaterial. What matters is the fact that the United States has placed even its satellite facilities at the disposal of Pakistan and in any future confrontation between India and Pakistan, India would be placed at a great disadvantage because even its latest defence movements would be known to Pakistan through the American Satellites.

The "movement" story about the Jagaur was a deliberate attempt by the United States to mislead its own Senators critical of their government's blind aid to Pakistan, despite hectic Pak attempts to go nuclear, and to justify the supply of the E-2C Hawkeye, which would add new dimension to the threat to India's security. Both Pakistan and the United States orchestrated with a pre-planned design the story about the "movement" of the Jagaur to derive the maximum mileage. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Yakub Khan seized on this "information" to demand a whole array of new weapon systems for the United States to defend the Pak nuclear installations from the Indian attack. With the air of injured innocence, he proceeded to warn India against such acts of "naked aggression" and reiterated with a

touch of bravado, his government's resolve to retaliate. Some of the officials accompanying him to the United States rushed to the Washington Post to accuse India of illegal occupation of 64 kilometres across the actual line of control from the glacial region to the Chinese border in Pakistan's North-East.

While Sahebzada Yakub Khan made suitable noises in Washington for help against India, the Washington correspondent of the Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, sent a despatch to his newspaper published on 5 Oct 84 about the US-offer of a nuclear umbrella to Pakistan contained in President Reagan's letter to Pak President, Zia-ul-Haq. Just five days later on 10 Oct 84, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr Deane R. Hinton told the Council of National Security Studies at Lahore that the United States would help Pakistan in case India attacked it, implying that India was a potential aggressor. Asked what the U.S. response would be in the event of an attack upon Pakistan, Mr. Hinton said, "I think we should be responsive quickly to contingencies from the West.....I think that if the contingency that we are talking about is from the East that, as I said earlier, we will not be neutral if there is an act committed by any one of flagrant aggression." Subsequently both Mr. George Shultz, the US Secretary of State during his visit to India to attend the funeral of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 3 Nov 84 and earlier Mr Richard Murphy, the Assistant Secretary of State during his visit to India on 22 Oct 84 reiterated the well-known U.S. position that American arms supply was not aimed against India nor did Washington want to paint India as aggressor and neither had it offered Pakistan a NATO type nuclear umbrella.

However, just a day before her assassination, Mrs Indira Gandhi put the things in a correct prospective when replying to questions at a Press conference in Bhubaneswer on 30 Oct 84 after inaugurating the Air Defence Missile School, she expressed her deep concern at the nuclear arms build up in and around the Sub-continent, including the Indian Ocean, and held those countries responsible "which do not want India to become strong and self-reliant," for the persistent threats to its borders and the resultant tension in the region. She made it clear that the weapons supplied by the United States to Pakistan earlier were used against India on several occasions. Painfully she asked, "Have we not been attacked by Pakistan as many as five times?" She felt indignant that the United States was once more equipping Pakistan with all kinds of sophisticated weapons.

US BASES IN PAKISTAN

Having become a part of the U.S. "strategic consensus" it became a natural corollary for Pakistan to agree to providing US bases on its

territory. Although President Zia has time and again denied the existence of U.S. bases, the fact that some knowledgeable Pakistanis themselves are convinced about the facilities offered by Pakistan to the United States to enable it to land its Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in Pakistani soils is a proof of the double talk of the Pakistani leaders. Some prominent Pakistani leaders living in exile in London have revealed that the United States was provided with certain facilities in Peshawar and Pir Patho in Sind and that these areas were controlled by the U.S. forces. These facts were announced by Mr Jam Sadiq Ali, a former Pakistani minister and currently a leader of the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) at a press conference in London on 26 Oct 84.

Another prominent Pakistani leader, Mr Attaullah Mengal, a former Chief Minister of Baluchistan, revealed that the US personnel were based in Quetta in a house belonging to a former Pakistani minister. Mr Mengal disclosed that the Americans had installed a monitoring system at Gwadar port on the coast of Baluchistan. These bases were built in Pakistan as part of an understanding between President Zia and President Reagan, primarily for possible deployment of the American RDF against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and in the Gulf area, which were of great strategic importance to the United States. According to Mr Mengal, the Americans were developing the Makran coast for military purposes and allocations for its development were made directly from Washington. The American installations are so secret and so tightly cordoned off that even President Zia may not fully know either the number of personnel stationed there or the facilities available for the future deployment of the RDF, according to Mr Mengal.

India has reasons to get deeply worried about the American bases in Pakistan. The U.S. policy-planners relate their military and diplomatic efforts to furthering the U.S. interests and view things in a global context. For them neither Zia nor Pakistan neither India nor its leaders are of any consequence. The CIA would not hesitate to sacrifice any of these to serve the ends of the U.S. global strategy. The close proximity of the U.S. bases in Pakistan pose grave threats to India's security. In a report captioned "Terrorism - the Politics of Washington", published in Pravada, the day following the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi, the CIA was named as the agency behind the project code-named "Brahmaputra", which was designed to support and train the Sikh separatists to destabilise and balkanise India. Even if one were to dismiss the Pravada report as an anti-US propaganda, one would find it hard to pick up a quarrel with the Toynbee literary award winning author, Ralph Buultjes, based at New York, who in a

televised interview on 4 Nov 84 said, "big powers do have extensive clandestine operations in India. The Larkins case demonstrated recently the extent of CIA penetration into various armed forces so I would not be inclined to totally write off this kind of comment (i.e., the Pravada report hinting CIA involvement with Mrs Gandhi's assassination)."

Apart from quartering the CIA agents, the U.S. bases in Pakistan bring the US-Soviet rivalry close to the doors of India and in an event of confrontation between the two, India may be caught in cross-fires. Besides, the monitoring facilities at Gwadar and the personnel, armament and equipment at other bases in Pakistan may be pressed to augment the Pak military effort against India, if not actually placed at the disposal of Pakistan.

THE ISLAMIC BOMB

It was in April 1979 that Mr Atal Behari Bajpai, the Janta Government Minister for External Affairs, made a statement in the Lok Sabha that Pakistan was acquiring military nuclear capabilities. In 1980 two Indian analysts, Major General Palit and Namboodiri published their book "Pakistan's Islamic Bomb" outlining Pak designs to use their nuclear effort for producing an Islamic Bomb and its repercussions on India's security environment. In February 1984 Dr. Abdul Quadeer Khan, the "Oppenheimer" of Pakistan revealed in an interview to the Nawa-i-Waqt, a Lahore newspaper, known to be an official mouthpiece of the Zia regime, that Pakistan had developed in a very short time the nuclear enrichment capability that West European countries took 20 years to master. He also claimed that Pakistan was far ahead of India in Uranium enrichment and that if given a "green signal" by Zia to make a bomb, the Pakistani nuclear scientists would be able to come upto his expectations. Dr Khan is possessed of a grand obsession for producing the Pakistani bomb, unmindful of the fact that his own family at Bhopal where he was born and where his elder brother still lives and works, may be destroyed by his own nuclear monster.

Dr Khan is known to have stolen from the Almelo enrichment plant in Holland the designs on which the Pakistani nuclear plant at Kahuta near Islamabad is based. A Dutch court convicted and sentenced Dr. Khan in absentia on the charge of stealing secret documents to a four-year prison term. Some other Pakistani scientists are also known to be engaged in clandestine activities in developed nuclear countries and obviously the aim of Pakistan is to piece-together

all nuclear know-how collected by its scientists abroad and produce a bomb no matter what sentences are pronounced by the foreign courts on the Pakistani nuclear spies as long as the convictions are in absentia. Even if one were to discount the claims of Dr. A. Q. Khan that Pakistan is capable of producing a bomb soon as a boastful assertion of an enthusiastic Pakistani scientist, the findings of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that Pakistani is virtually able to make a nuclear bomb come as a chilling reminder. The U.S. media, which deliberately confuses the world opinion about the Pakistani intentions by issuing contradictory reports about nuclear developments in Pakistan, came up with yet another interesting piece of story when the Wall Street Journal quoted American officials to say that the U.S. authorities believed that Pakistan is going ahead with its plans to make the nuclear bomb with Chinese assistance.

Interestingly, the U.S. officials who revealed the fact about the Sino-Pak nuclear collusion, chose to make their statement after the U.S. Senate rejected on 4 Oct 84 an amendment introduced by the Democratic Senator, Alen Cranston, who wanted the United States to enforce controls on Pakistani nuclear programme. Speaking at the crucial meeting of the Senate, Mr. Cranston, who had painstakingly collected valuable data on Pakistani nuclear programme, said that there was clear evidence that Pakistan was developing a nuclear capability and that three years of U.S. aid had failed to encourage the Pakistan Government to abandon the nuclear alternative in favour of conventional arms provided by the United States. The Reagan administration opposed the amendment arguing that it would alienate the Pakistan government and threaten Pakistani support for Afghan resistance fighters.

The United States indulgently blinks at the Pakistani nuclear programme and may even be conniving with China to ensure that Pakistan develops a credible nuclear capability. The U.S. double talk is a calculated design to confuse the Indian policy makers and prevent them from adopting suitable remedial measures against Pakistani provocations. What Pakistan and some Arab countries proudly hail as the Islamic bomb in an exuberance of Islamic fervour against the Zionist Israel, the United States considers an inevitable development which may rather come sooner than latter because it could be harnessed in the American global military strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Tactically it could provide a moral booster to the Afghan Mujahideens. Pakistan, however, cannot use its bomb against Israel, because of the close US-Israel ties, nor can it use the

bomb against the Soviet Union, simply because it would be inviting self-annihilation. All that Pakistan is interested is to use its bomb against India, not necessarily by dropping it on the Indian troops or territory, a contingency which cannot be ruled out but by exploiting its nuclear capability for bargaining, blackmailing pro-Khalistani terrorists, nibbling Indian territory, occupying Kashmir in a surprise move and harassing India in several other overt and covert ways.

PAK OPTIONS

It is essential first to understand the aim of Pakistan so that its options could be determined. The aim of Pakistan is to destabilise India in two ways : in the short term by avenging its defeat of 1971 and in the long run to create a series of crises for India to keep it in a state of perpetual turmoil so that India may not be able to develop and, in contrast, Pakistan may surpass India to justify the two nation theory of Jinnah. Perhaps nothing could give a greater pleasure to the Pak leaders than to see India in discomfiture, in whatever manner it can be caused. An outright defeat of India in a war, the capture of Punjab for proclaiming it as a satellite Khalistani State, occupation of Kashmir for declaring it as a Part of Pakistan and the capture of some one lakh Indian troops as prisoners-of-war would be an ideal situation to avenge the defeat of 1971 and the loss of the Eastern Pakistan. The American arms, the F-16s, the E-2C Hawkeyes and the bomb on one hand and the removal of the towering personality of Mrs Gandhi from the Indian Scene, offers Zia a tempting situation to launch a blitzkrieg. Seven divisions of Pakistani Army supported by the Pakistan Air Force are kept in a state of high alert on the North-Eastern borders of Pakistan facing Kashmir and Punjab. Recently these troops conducted the biggest land and air exercise in their history at the Indo-Pak borders.

President Zia is a gambler and has proved his iron determination when he executed Bhutto despite hostile world opinion. It is, therefore, very much within the realm of possibility that while vociferously articulating slogans of peace and friendship with India, Zia may resort to a lightning attack, achieving his goals and declaring a unillateral cease-fire, leaving the rest to his American and Western friends to manage the affairs for him in the Security Council and present India with a fait accompli.

A war with India may, however, prove to be a suicidal folly, for the Indian defence forces are well trained, well armed, highly motivated and rated among the best in the world and the Indian people resilient, patriotic and known to sink their petty differences in times of

national crisis. The examples of Arub and Yahya should act as a deterrence to Zia, unless he is a reckless gambler determined to plunge the subcontinent into another war.

A better course for Pakistan would be an intensification of its current policy of destabilising India in collusion with the CIA. Pakistan is known to be training Sikh extremists for creating trouble in Punjab and in other parts of India. Hijacking of Indian Airlines aircraft, providing landing facilities to the hijackers and supplying them arms and ammunition and later, with considerable dilly-dallying, staging fake trials and providing sanctuary to the murderers of Indian diplomats abroad are the parts of the over-all Conspiracy. A plot to dismember India by carving out Punjab and certain other areas for creating Khalistan and to occupy the Kashmir Valley for integrating it with Pakistan appears to have been jointly worked out by Zia, the CIA and the Sikh extremists, some of whom have migrated to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and some other Western countries. There is a plenty of evidence to prove the deep involvement of Pakistan in such a sinister game. Apart from what the Indian former Home Secretary Mr MMK wali revealed about the hand of Pakistan in secessionist activities in Punjab, some of the terrorists themselves apprehended by the security forces confessed of receiving training in Pakistan for creating wide spread trouble in India, including the liquidation of the top leaders. On 26 Oct 84, the security forces nabbed four heavily armed terrorist coming in a car from the Ajnala sector of Pakistan. Two of these identified as Upkar Singh Sandhu, brother of Harminder Singh Sandhu, General Secretary of the All India Sikh Students Federation and Iqbal Singh, a close associate of the late militant Sikh leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale disclosed that they were trained by the Pakistan Army and given heavy "remunerations" for the specific task of "eliminating some of the national leaders".

On 31 Oct 84 Mrs Indira Gandhi was assassinated in her own residence by Sikh terrorists who managed to infiltrate the select force of her own bodyguards. President Zia talked of peace and friendship when he visited India for the funeral of Mrs Gandhi only to return to Pakistan to receive the Khalistan protagonist Mr Ganga Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale's nephew Mr Jasbir Singh and other extremists, who ostensibly went to Pakistan to pay their homage to Guru Nank on the occasion of his birth anniversary at Nankana Sahib, the birth place of the Guru. An assembly of the top-ranking pro-khalistan extremists in Pakistan, the raising of anti-India slogans and a barrage of highly inflammatory speeches, coming at the

heels of Mrs Gandhi's assassination and Zia's plea for a fresh approach to the Indo-Pakistan relations, clearly indicate the nefarious role being played by Pakistan behind the mask of friendly gestures and offer of a no-war pact.

Through a pre-planned programme the Zia regime and the CIA would orchestrate a propaganda and diplomatic offensive beamed from Islamabad, Washington and other western capitals offering peace pacts and even economic, trade and cultural protocols but operating stealthily to dismember India and carve out satellite States out of the Indian Union. Apart from what the pro-Khalistan extremists are doing both within and out of India, there are several other developments which are a pointer to the designs of some of the countries hostile to India. These are the building up of Diego Garcia as a military base, the sanctuary provided to the tribal insurgents by Bangladesh, the increased naval activity in the Indian Ocean, the proposed setting up of an American naval base in Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, the American bases in Pakistan and the promotion of anti-India sentiments in Nepal. Pakistan occupies the central place in this drama, the full ramifications of which only time will unfold.

Nepal as a Zone of Peace & India's Northern Security

APARNA TRIPATHI*

THE tiny Himalayan kingdom of Nepal comprising of 54,536 square miles, roughly half the size of Uttar Pradesh.....in the shape of elongated rectangle extending 500 miles east to west has for centuries remained, for most of the world, a land of mystery and romance. Till 1928, according to Percival Landel only about 128 Englishmen and 10 other Europeans had set foot in the Kathmandu Valley. Upto 1948, from the time of the first British Resident Brian Hodgson (1833-1848), no British Resident had been allowed to set foot outside the Kathmandu Valley. It is only since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 that Nepal has been suddenly thrust into the fore-ground of the international scene because of its strategic position between India and the Chinese-occupied Tibet.

Geographically, Nepal is situated on the Southern slopes of the Himalayas—which form a natural divide between the high Tibetan plateau (average height 10,000') and the plains of India. Geostrategically, dwarfed by her two large and powerful neighbours, Nepal throughout its history has found security in isolation and in policies of co-operation with the more powerful of its neighbours. In 1791-92 its repeated attacks on Tibet brought down armed reprisals by the Manchu Empire and it had to accept a tributary status. Blocked in the north, she turned its energies to South and annexed Sikkim, Kumaon, Garhwal and Simla Hill states—areas of British interest. A war with Britain in 1814-15 ensued—the Manchu rulers did not help militarily but their influence saved Nepal from being annexed by the British, after it was dispossessed of all territories gained by it after 1792. A permanent British Resident was posted at Kathmandu—despite protests of Chinese Emperor. Nepal's expansionist policy now changed to one of co-operation with the British. In 1861, Sikkim (a vassal of Tibet) became a British Protectorate with Bhutan, Assam, Ladakh, Kashmir following suit. The British India now lay its claim

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to a Himalayan frontier stretching from Pamirs to the Tri-junction of India, Burma and Tibet in the east. Nepal was a sovereign state only in name. For all practical purposes, Britain treated Nepal as a constituent part of the British India defence parameter.

The fall of the Manchu's in 1912, World War I, and Russian Revolution of 1917—none posed a threat to the security of British India. The pivot of the entire fragile structure was Tibet. Effective British control at Lhasa kept the Himalayan states in line by denying them other options. Nepal served as a model within this system and helped to keep down restiveness in the other two states.

In 1947 the British left leaving the sub-continent weak and divided between independent India and Pakistan. For the first time in over a century, Nepal was to maintain diplomatic relations with Britain. Despite this the new India accepted the Himalayan frontier as part of its inheritance.

The communist victory on the mainland of China in 1949 saw the emergence of a united China with Soviet Union as its ally. The British Empire had never faced such an adversary. From 1949-54 communist China did not press its traditional claims on Nepal respecting the sensitivities of both Nepal and India. Lhasa continued to pay its annuity until as late as 1953. Nepal traders were not taxed. Nepal courts functioned—Nepali armed contingents remained in Lhasa¹. China was moving cautiously. It wanted prior settlement with India over Tibet. In Oct. 1950, Peoples Liberation Army moved to "Liberate" Tibet. India's response came in the form of enunciation of what we know as the "Nehru Doctrine for the Himalayas". In October, Pandit Nehru declared that the Mc. Mahon line is "Our Boundary, map or no map."² He told the Parliament:

"From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier ... we cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated, for it is also the principal barrier to India. Much as we stand for the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal, or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."³

1. The New York Times, 8 May, 1954.

2. Quoted in Mark C. Fear, "India's Himalayan Frontiers; conditions in Nepal" for Eastern Survey 22, Oct, 1953, pp. 133-141.

3. J. L. Nehru "INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY" : Selected Speeches, Sept. 1946-61 (New Delhi) Publications DIVISION : 15 Apr. 1961, p. 435.

The implications of the statement are clear. India was laying down as minimum condition, China's acceptance of the Himalayan frontier as Nehru claimed for India. It also gave Nepal unilateral guarantee of defence and that the defence of the Himalayas was basic to India's security to which if need arose Nepal's independence might be subordinated. In the secret exchange of letters, accompanying the *Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace & Friendship* of 1950, the operative portion read :

"Neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with such threat the two governments shall consult each other and devise effective counter-measures.⁴"

But, in late August 1959, Kathmandu, with the disclosure of Chou-En-Lai correspondence with Nehru, became aware that it could no longer rest its security on the assumption that China will not antagonise India. For the first time realizing the dangers inherent in their geographical location they decided to remain neutral in the differences of two neighbours.⁵

In November, 1959, two months after Nepali decision to remain neutral came Nehru's statement that any aggression on Bhutan or Nepal would be considered aggression on India.⁶ This comment was irking to Nepal because it equated the status of Nepal with Bhutan. Nepal was afraid that New Delhi had presumed both the right to declare the existence of threat, as well as the right to determine the appropriate counter-measures. Koirala, immediately, welcoming Nehru's statement as an expression of friendship added : "In the event of any aggression on Nepal, it is Nepal who will decide if there has been any aggression."⁷

This implied that Nepal had rejected the Nehru Doctrine because it refused that a threat to India was *automatically* a threat to Nepal. It denied Nepal Himalayas to be part of India's frontier both in terms of policy towards China and in terms of defence. Subsequently, India's reactions to certain domestic happenings in Nepal led to souring of relations between the two countries, which reached the climax in 1960, when India's criticism of King Mahendra's royal coup

4. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, pp. 373-374.

5. *The New York Times*, 12 Aug. 1958.

6. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 370.

7. *The Statesman*, Calcutta 30 Nov. 1969.

pushed Nepal firmly into closer relations with China and Pakistan.⁸ China gave full support to King's "Patriotic act" and called his opposers 'anti-national traitors.'⁹ In Sino-Indian Border war of 1962, Nepal observed strict neutrality. Nepal's separate political identity was no longer a matter of speculation and consequently, it was no longer an *organic* part of India's defence and security parameter. But, even a cursory look at the map will make it clear that Nepal *is*, and will always *be*, vital to India's northern security and therefore we should try to re-establish a mutually meaningful relationship.

Nepal's Zone of Peace proposal which was originally meant to be raised at the Non-aligned summit at Algiers in Sept. 1973 was actually announced by King Birendra on the occasion of his coronation reception in Feb. 1975. Since then, it has been incorporated as a major foreign policy goal in the Third Amendment to the constitution as a Directive Principal of State Policy. Since then Nepal has been making consistent efforts to gain the support of international community for this proposal. In Dec. 1983, President Reagan endorsed Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal. So far, more than 30 countries have stated their willingness to endorse this—which include China, Bangla Desh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. India is still studying the Nepalese proposal.

Kathmandu has offered a seven-point elaboration or classification which commits Nepal to non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, (2) Non-use of force; (3) Peaceful settlement of disputes; (4) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; (5) disallowing any activity on its soil hostile to any other state; (6) continued adherence to the existing treaties as long as they remain valid (including Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace & Friendship); (7) eschewing military alliances or foreign bases on its territory. In all these matters Nepal quite rightly seeks reciprocity.

India's doubts, basically, revolve round the need to declare Nepal a Zone of Peace, given the 1950 INDO-Nepal Treaty and the improving trend in the normalisation of Sino-Indian relations.

India is also sceptical about the concept of a single-nation Zone of Peace, and its implications in the present circumstances of open border.

8. Coup had made "a travesty of democracy": Nehru, India's Foreign Policy p. 44.

9. SCMP, No. 2593, 6 Oct. 1961.

There is apprehension too that accepting Nepal as a Zone of Peace will weaken India's opposition to Pakistan's pleas for declaring South Asia as a Zone of Peace. Also this will bind India to commitments inapplicable to China.

In April 1960, when a Ten year Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in Kathmandu, during the visit of Chinese Premier,¹⁰ a non-aggression pact was also proposed which Koirala declined on the grounds that both countries adhered to the Panch-Shila which called for peaceful co-existence.¹¹ In face of Koirala's refusal China swiftly proposed a substitute project which was—the highly controversial Kathmandu : Kodari road project, which was completed in May, 1967. India feels that effort should be made to establish peace and stability in the entire-South Asian region and not piece-meal.

Opinions seem to be sharply divided on the issue in India. One school of thought feels that Indian response has been unduly cautious and advocates Nepal's case, as a Zone of Peace, as a small developing nation's desire to institutionalize peace in the land of the Buddha. According to them, there is no harm at all if we enlarge the area of peace around India and see this zone of peace as an extension of the concept of the Zone of Peace being canvassed else-where such as in the Indian Ocean.¹² They believe that real security lies in regional co-operation. In short, they prefer the SARC route to security because it would be desirable, durable and reliable. We should deal with the problem with vigorous and result oriented diplomacy towards our little neighbourly states to woo them back to the fold. With common cultural, religious and historical traditions which all the south Asian countries share, all our problems can be managed intrinsically, without big power interference.

The present vigorous attempts by Nepal to internationalise its problems is not going to improve matters. India looks, upon the Zone of Peace proposal of Nepal as a mischievous move by big powers to embarrass India and has warned Nepal not to become a cat's paw in their game. Involving Pakistan & Bangladesh who have no common frontiers with Nepal has no rationale and can only act as an irritant.

10. Text of Agreement in NEW DEVELOPMENT IN FRIENDLY RELATIONS Between China & Nepal, p. 21.

11. This was revealed by Koirala. See also Times of INDIA (New Delhi) 28, April, 1960.

12. Indian Express, Dec 13, 1983.

Nepal has an open border with India and a closed and disputed one with China. If it becomes a Zone of Peace, border between Nepal and India would be closed—Nepalis will have to then carry passports as aliens—their entry will be restricted—their employment chances zero—a large number of them may have to be re-patriated. This disaster scenario is just the tip of the ice-berg. King Birendra should give a second thought before opting out of the sub-continental security perimeter. Till China occupies Tibet, Nepal's Himalayan crest will remain India's security parameter and security obligation too. Let us not build walls anymore at least where none exist yet! We should ask ourselves like Robert Frost.

Before I built a wall I would ask to know
What I was walling *in* or walling *out*.
And to whom I would give offence.
Something there is that does not love a wall.

Let this zone of peace not come in the way of our open border relationship this can only cramp our progress towards understanding and eventual brotherhood. It would be a retrograde step in our traditional relationship of amity and understanding built over centuries.

Readjustment, Frontier Security And Civil Disobedience : The Indian Army Between The Two World Wars

DR. S. D. PRADHAN

THE period between the two World Wars is very significant for the history of the Indian Army. During this period far reaching changes in the organisation, equipment and composition had taken place. These changes were the products of the political developments in India, the changing British response to these developments and the British policy towards Russia and Afghanistan.

The situation in India in the post World War I period, was not quite comfortable for the British. During the war the British government promised progressive reforms by the Secretary of State for India's Declaration of August 1917¹. It naturally raised the hopes of the Indians for freedom and democracy. The hopes were further encouraged by the propaganda machinery of the Indian Government during the war.²

When the Indians were expecting more concessions, the Rowlatt Act of 1919 came to them as a thunderclap which sought to give the extra-ordinary repressive powers to the Government of India. This Act authorized the Government of India in 1919 to retain summary powers vested in them during the First World War. It was based upon the recommendations of a committee which inquired into seditious activities in India and was presided over by Sir Sidney Rowlatt of the King's Bench in England.³ Gandhi was surprised and pained at the flouting of the unanimous voice of the politically conscious Indians in the matter of the Rowlatt legislation.⁴ He organised against it his first major countrywide satyagrah⁵ campaign in the spring of 1919. The immediate purpose of this campaign was to make the government see the error of its ways⁶, though he was aware of its long term implications. However, the subsequent events gave a rude shock to the Indian sentiments. Like most of his countrymen, Gandhi was deeply hurt by the cold-blooded murder of hundreds of unarmed civilians by General Dyer at Amritsar on 13 April 1919.⁷ The Indians were further disturbed by the manner in which the British government had gone back on its war-time promises to the Indian Muslims regarding the future of Turkey and the Khilafat. Even the

terms of the Treaty of Severes with Turkey, published in May 1920, were considered by most Indians to be a breach of the pledges given earlier by the British statesmen⁸. The institution of the Hunter Committee to investigate into the tragedy at Amritsar was regarded by the Indians as an attempt to whitewash the culprits and therefore the Indian National Congress decided to not to cooperate with the committee and established its own enquiry committee.⁹ It was under these circumstances that Gandhi propounded the idea of non-violent non-cooperation in late November 1919.¹⁰ The enraged and aggrieved Indians accepted this idea to enforce the national will and to secure the redress of the Khilafat and Punjab wrongs. It was launched on 1 August 1920 and the special session of the Congress, held at Calcutta in September 1920, approved of and adopted Gandhi's programme and affirmed that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future was establishment of the *swarajya*.¹¹ From 1919 to 1947 five major movements were launched by the Indian National Congress against the British for the attainment of independence. These movements are known as the Non-Cooperation Movements of 1919 and 1921-22, the Civil Disobedience Movements of 1930 and 1932 and the Quit India Movement of 1942. The extremists added further troubles for the British.

While on the one hand, the Civil Disobedience Movements were creating problems for the British rule in India, the frontier security, on the other hand, was also proving an equally difficult task to be handled. In the post-World War I period, the British foreign policy, which gave complexion to Government of India's external relations, was predominantly influenced by two developments, first the existence of the communist Soviet Union and secondly the rise of fascist states of Germany and Italy. To a large extent, the United Kingdom strove to contain the spread of communism in Asia lest it should adversely affect the maintenance of empire in India and other South-Asian territories. This involved revival of interest in Afghanistan, China and the Middle Eastern countries.¹² The Russian interest in the Central Asia created a sense of alarm in the United Kingdom. Soon after, the developments in Afghanistan brought India and Afghanistan to a war known as the Third Afghan War. In China, where the British interests were increasing, the Russians already had spread their tentacles. Later, the Japanese imperialistic policy also threatened to disturb the status-quo. Although India had no direct relations with China, but the attitude and the policy of Government of India towards China were determined by those of the British government. The British government regarded in this period integrity of China as essential for the protection of British interests there. In the

disturbed times, after the Nationalist Revolution in China when the British were faced with the serious opposition, the Indian troops were sent to Shanghai for the protection of the British interests.¹³

Thus, the developments in India and Asia, required the British government to take steps for the protection of the British interests. It was natural for the British to bring about changes in the Indian Army so that it could efficiently protect their interests. The changes as stated earlier, were mainly influenced by two forces; first the British desire to protect their empire and the imperial interests in this region, and secondly, the demand of the nationalists in India for concessions. The Indian Army, therefore, entered into a new phase after the First World War in its chequered history.

During the World War I, a number of deficiencies and defects of the Indian Army came to limelight, which needed to be rectified. Hence, in 1919, a committee of seven persons was formed to make recommendations to increase the efficiency of the Indian Army. This committee was known after its chairman Lord Esher, as the Esher Committee.¹⁴ This committee dealt in detail with all the problems of the Indian Army. While making recommendations, the Esher Committee claimed to work on the following three principles:¹⁵

1. The control of Indian military affairs should be given to Government of India.
2. The Government of India should have a voice in questions of imperial defence.
3. The Imperial General Staff should be allowed to exercise considerable influence on the military policy of Government of India.

The Esher Committee submitted its findings on June 22, 1920. The war experience was taken into consideration while making recommendations in its various services and arms.

The Esher Committee felt that the control of British Parliament on the Indian military affairs should be brought to minimum to avoid delay in dealing with military questions.¹⁶ Hence, it recommended that there should be direct communication between the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of Imperial Staff, who was empowered to take decisions on military matters in India. The Secretary of State for India was to be informed on military matters of India.¹⁷

The Esher Committee also recommended that both the Army Department and Headquarters Staff be consolidated under the

Commander-in-Chief having single secretariat.¹⁸ Their jurisdictions often overlapped, hence led to difficult situations and were not conducive to efficiency.¹⁹ It also proposed the establishment of a Military Council to assist the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), with C-in-C as the President of the Council.²⁰ In the field, it recommended the "Command System" which was introduced in 1895²¹ but was abolished later. In Services, it recommended the establishment of the Department for Production and Provision for procuring essential items such as foodstuffs, clothing and munitions. In arms, it recommended the reorganisation of the Indian Army on the pattern of the British Army.²³ The Silladar system in cavalry was to be abolished. During the war it was felt that sufficient number of recruits for the Silladar cavalry were difficult to find because only financially well off persons could join.²⁴ Motor transport companies were to be established on regular basis. The strengthening of reserve force was strongly emphasised.

The Esher Committee favoured certain concessions to the Indian sepoy. Improvement in pay, extra duty pays, first free issue of uniform, better family pensions, accommodation and facilities for the education of children were recommended. However, there was little that was done by this committee to Indianise the officer cadre of the Indian Army. But the two Indian members of the Esher Committee—Sir K Gupta and Sir Umar Hayat Khan—had taken up this issue though both of them differed in their attitude. Sir K Gupta demanded that the superior positions of the Indian Army be opened to qualified Indians, without consideration of castes.²⁵ He also demanded that training and educational institutions be established in India to enable the Indians to enter into all branches of the Indian Army.²⁶ But the other Indian member, Sir Umar Hayat Khan, did not agree with the proposals of Sir K Gupta. He argued that the recruitment policy based on the 'martial race theory' was best suited.²⁷

The Esher Committee, in short, while made exhaustive recommendations for re-organisation of the Indian Army, it neglected the Indian aspirations of Indianising the Indian Army. After the World War I, the demand for the latter was increasing. When the Esher Committee Report was released, the moderates and the liberals in the Legislative Assembly of February-March 1921 took the opportunity of expressing their demand. Sir P S Sivaswamy Aiyer, a leading moderate from Madras, who was keenly interested in military affairs, introduced fifteen resolutions on the Esher Committee Report. One of the resolutions called for the use of the Indian Army only for the purpose of India's security and not for the British imperial interests.

Two other crucial resolutions which led to extensive debate were the product of the desire of the Indians to Indianise the Indian Army. The first, resolution No. 7, called for the admission of the Indian subjects into all arms and services and also recommended that the Indians be given every encouragement to enter the commissioned ranks of the army.²⁸ It also recommended that not less than 25% of the King's Commissions granted every year be given to the Indians.²⁹ The second, resolution No. 8, called for the establishment of a Military College like that of Sandhurst and that the Indians be provided with the preliminary military training.³⁰

The Government accepted the above resolutions. For, if these recommendations were ignored, the moderates, whose support was of great value in view of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movements, would have been annoyed. However, on the question of the increased commissions for the Indians, an amendment was moved which was carried by one vote. The amendment desired that the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers be given preference for the grant of the King's Commissions and that rest of the commissions be granted to cadets trained at Sandhurst, who "should be from the communities which furnish recruits to the army and, as far as possible, in proportion to the numbers in which they furnish recruits".³¹ Thus arose a controversy between the advocates of the 'martial race' and the others who did not subscribe to this theory. Therefore, the British Indian Government decided to examine, in detail, the entire question of Indianisation.

A committee under Shea was established in 1921 which gave its recommendations in 1922. It recommended that the Indianisation should be completed in three phases.³² The total period of this process was fixed at 42 years but later it was reduced to 30 years.³³ The first phase was to last 14 years, the second 9 years and the third 7 years. It recommended the gradual increase in the number of the Indian officers and that the review of the situation be made after every phase.³⁴ It favoured the establishment of a military college in India.

The British Government while under pressure from the nationalists was forced to accept Indianisation of armed forces in India, it was equally concerned about the efficiency of the Indian Army. The Third Afghan War had further increased their concern about the efficiency. It reiterated that the Indian Army had the primary responsibility for the security of India, hence it was not prepared to commit itself for any programme of Indianisation of the Indian Army

until it was proved that such a scheme would not be detrimental to the efficiency of the Indian Army. Indianisation was therefore to be carried out as an experiment and eight units of cavalry and infantry were set apart for this purpose.³⁵ Only Indian officers, in future, were to be posted to these units. The number of seats in 1923, was increased to ten every year for training in the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. The demand of the Legislative Assembly for the establishment of the preliminary training institute for Indians to compete for the entrance into the Sandhurst College, had already been met. In March 1922, the Prince of Wales' Royal Military College was opened at Dehra Dun for giving education on English Public School lines to the prospective candidates for commissions. However, the British Government refused to give commissions to Indians in the air force and technical services. Such a thing was regarded as potentially dangerous for the continued British supremacy in India.³⁶ It is interesting to note that during the World War I, four Indians had obtained commissions in the Royal Air Force.

While the British Indian Government was making readjustment in the wake of the nationalists' demand for Indianisation of the armed forces, the frontier security and the non cooperation movements demanded reorganisation of the Indian Army to deal with the then existing situation. Even after the Third Afghan War, the north-west frontier remained in turmoil and the Government of India had to resort to a number of punitive military expeditions to quell the disturbances. On the basis of the Esher Committee recommendations, important changes in the organisation of the Indian Army were made during 1920-23. The armed forces were divided into 3 groups. First, there was a Covering Force, which was to guard the north-west frontier against hostile tribal attacks and in case of war, to allow time for the rest of the army to be mobilised to face enemy. Secondly, there was the Field Army which was the main body of the Army and which was meant for the large-scale fighting. And, lastly, there were the Internal Security Troops whose role was to prevent a civil uprising and protection of railway lines. The three categories of troops were distinct but the units in one could be transferred to any other category. This was done to bring uniformity among different units. In the cavalry, Silladar system was abolished and 21 regiments were grouped together into seven groups of three regiments each. Each group had a Group Depot which was responsible for training and sending forward reinforcements for the whole group. The groups of infantry battalions were also allotted a regimental centre which enlisted and trained recruits for reinforcing any of the

battalions of that group. A new system of reservists was also introduced. Service in the reserve was made compulsory instead of optional. In addition, permanent voluntary forces were established. The Auxiliary Force (India), which comprised only the British subjects was given a definite purpose of maintaining law and order. The Indian Territorial Force was created in 1920 out of the Indian Defence Force of the World War 1st. The main function of this force was to help in the maintenance of law and order and also to serve as a reserve force. The University Training Corps was also created to train students. This assured the availability of trained manpower which could be drawn upon when required.

To improve its efficiency, the Indian Army was provided with better equipments. The British were on the horns of dilemma so far equipments were concerned. They desired to improve its efficiency to serve the British imperial interests but at the same time, it appears, they did not desire to make it so strong as to be capable of giving challenge to the British forces in case the Indian soldiers come under the influence of the Nationalist Movement. From the secret intelligence reports, the British Indian Government gathered that the Congress had established a committee to reduce the soldiers.³⁸ The Akalis in Punjab were also working on the Sikh soldiers and it became difficult to get the recruits from the Jat Sikh community.³⁹ The Ali brothers had issued a *Fatwa* to effect that service in the Army and the Police was unlawful for the Muslims.⁴⁰ Therefore, it seems, the British Indian Government decided to keep the Indian units weaker than the British units. For example, while the British Army's infantry battalions had 8 medium machine guns and 34 light machine guns, the Indian infantry battalions had only 4 medium machine guns and 16 light machine guns.⁴¹

The ratio between the British and the Indian soldiers in 1893 was fixed and was 1 British to every 2.5 Indian soldiers. Siwaswamy Aiyer demanded reduction of the British in the Army. The political considerations, it appears, again played an important part in this regard. While in the Covering Troops the ratio of the British was reduced, in the Internal Security Troops and in the Field Army the previous ratio was maintained. In 1921, in the three types of the troops ratio was as follows : in the Field Army it was 1 British soldier to every 2.7 Indian soldiers, in the Covering Troops it was 1 to 6.7, and in the Internal Security Troops it was 1 to 2.42.⁴²

Other important changes included reorganisation or establishment of certain services. The strength of the Signal Service before the war

was inadequate and it formed the part of the Sappers and Miners. But after the war, an Indian Signal Corps was formed, on the line of Corps of Sappers and Miners.⁴³ The Supply and Transport Corps was amalgamated with the Royal Army Service to form the Indian Army Service Corps. The Ordnance Services were reorganised and a new Indian Army Ordnance Corps was established. Mechanical Transport services were added; Artillery was reorganised; a reorganisation of Military Engineering Service was carried out; a self-contained Army Veterinary Corps was formed.

Soon after the war, the financial stringency became acute and the public opinion in India also demanded a cut in defence expenditure so that funds could be made available for improving the conditions of the Indians. A committee under Incheape was formed to deal with the task of retrenchment with a view to reducing expenditure. The defence budget was brought down, as a result of retrenchment from Rs. 65 crores to Rs. 56 crores annually.⁴⁴ An interesting feature of the retrenchment was that the cut was made almost entirely in the classes recruited for the first time during the war or among those who had been dropped earlier but were recruited during the war again.⁴⁵ The Bengalis and the Madrasis were most vulnerable to these cuts. It appears that the increasing political awareness in Bengal and Madras influenced the termination of recruitment from these regions.⁴⁶ But the recruitment from Punjab continued despite the fact that it was no longer politically quiet. One of the possible explanations for this can be that there existed strong links with the military and the British thought the Punjabis were the best suited for the security of the north-west frontier as they knew the terrain very well.

One of the major demands, after the war, was Indianisation of the Indian Army. As stated earlier, some efforts in this direction had been made till 1924. However, the 'eight unit scheme' was received with dismay and it aroused protests from the Indians. They did not like the segregation of the Indian Officers in a few units reserved for them. In addition, the Indians pointed out that under the scheme for Indianisation given by the Shea Committee would require about 23 years to Indianise completely even those few experimental units. The pressure from the Indian moderates, a group which the British wanted to keep pacified in the light of the growth of extremist elements and terrorism, was increasing to take up Indianisation of Indian Army seriously. This matter was again taken up in February-March 1924 in the Legislative Assembly. The Government was forced to give an assurance that they would appoint

a committee to examine the means of attracting the best qualified Indian youths to military career and of giving them a suitable military education. In August 1925 a committee for this purpose was appointed, comprising of leading Indian leaders like Motilal Nehru and Jinnah. It was presided by Lt. Gen. Sir Andrew Skeen, Chief of the General Staff⁴⁷ The report of the Skeen Committee, as it was popularly known, finalised its draft by November 1926. The Committee's major recommendations, which were encouraging to the Indians, were as follows—first, doubling of the number of vacancies reserved for Indians at Sandhurst; secondly, formation of a Military College in India in 1933 on the lines of the Sandhurst College; thirdly, the Indians were to be made eligible for employment as King's Commissioned Officers in the Artillery, Engineering, Signal, Tank and Air arms of the Indian Army; fourthly, the abolition of the 'eight unit scheme'.⁴⁸

The Government did not accept all the recommendations. By now the situation on the political front had witnessed a great change. The British were greatly concerned about the revolutionary groups like the Sikh conspiracy 1923-26⁴⁹ and the *Naujawan Bharat Sabha*⁵⁰ (Indian Youth Association). The Babbar Akali Movement of the ex-soldiers had already created a consternation in the British mind. Hence the British did not desire complete Indianisation as the Indian Army was the main instrument of their power in India and the Indian Army had been frequently used to quell the anti-British movements. For two years, the British Indian Government considered the recommendations of the Skeen Committee, and in March 1928 they announced that as a result of the recommendations, they agreed to increase the vacancies reserved for the Indians at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst from 10 to 20 per year and to allow the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers to qualify for additional vacancies at Sandhurst. It was also announced that both the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich and the Royal Air Force College, Granewell would be thrown open to the Indian Cadets. The number of vacancies reserved for the Indians in each of the above institutions was fixed at 6.⁵¹ However, the idea of fixing a time limit for Indianisation and the proposal for appointment of the Indian officers throughout the Indian Army were rejected. It was also decided that in the eight units earmarked for Indianisation, Indian King's Commissioned Officers (KCOs) would be appointed to replace the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (V.C.Os).⁵² These decisions were not welcomed by the Indian opinion. The Indian leaders particularly criticised the decision of replacement of V.C.Os and K.C.Os on three grounds. First, it considerably reduced the chances of promotion of the Indian officers. It was

calculated that, whereas previously approximately one out of every three officers could hope to reach Lieutenant Colonel's rank, after the reorganisation only one out of every eight officers would have a similar opportunity. Secondly, it was pointed out that since the Indian officers would replace the V.C.Os, their prestige would be adversely affected. Thirdly, it would make the Indianised units far more costly, as the pay of K.C.Os, was much higher than V.C.Os.

It appears that the real motive of the British in doing this was to not to increase the number of the Indian officers in the units of the Indian Army. The British might have thought that the Indian officers could come under the influence of the anti-British feelings and that could dangerously weaken their instrument of power. Hence, for the British, it was desirable to keep them at one place. At the same time there was the problem of absorbing 20 Indian officers every year. The replacement of V.C.Os by K.C.Os at least solved the problem of absorbing the Indian officers temporarily.

At this time, the Indian Nationalist Movement had taken a turn. In 1927 at the Madras Session, the Congress declared complete national independence as its goal, though later it agreed to accept Dominion status if granted before 31 December 1929. The British Government appointed the Simon Commission which was boycotted by the Indians as they did not agree with its constitution. The All Parties Conference appointed a Committee of Indians under Motilal Nehru in May 1928, to suggest principles of the constitution for India. This committee recommended that there should be popular control over defence matters and Indian Army, formation of a high level civil-military committee of Defence, and stepping up of Indianisation of the Indian Army.⁵³ These recommendations reflected the thinking of moderate nationalists in India.

Soon, even the moderate nationalists became aware of the British Government's apathy to introduce reforms. The Indian National Congress at its Lahore Session of 1929, declared that their aim was to gain *swarajya* i.e. complete independence. On 26 January 1930, the memorable resolution on the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Republic of India was adopted. The Congress also decided to go ahead with its programme of 'Civil Disobedience' involving defiance of unjust and oppressive laws, refusal to pay taxes, boycotting foreign goods, etc. On April 6, 1930, Gandhi opened the Civil Disobedience campaign with his famous march to Dandi in symbolic defiance of the salt tax. The British Indian Government took drastic

measures. Gandhi and other leaders were imprisoned. The Government resorted to firing 29 times within a short period.⁵⁴ On one of the occasions of firing, the Indian troops of 2/18 Royal Garhwal Rifles refused to fire on Indians at Peshawar. The incident is known as Garhwali Mutiny of 23 April 1930. According to the official report, it was suspected to be the result of the 'seditious propaganda' in the Indian Army.⁵⁵ It was regarded to be of great significance as it marked the first crack in the Indian Army.

Not only the Nationalist Movement, but the developments at the north-west frontier, created problems for the British Indian Government. There had been a serious rising of the Waziris, Mohamands and Afridis in the North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P) in 1930-31 and the Government of India promulgated the 'N.W.F.P. Public Safety Regulation.' The suspicion of the Russian designs had further added to the British problems. To counter the Russian designs in Afghanistan, in November 1927, the Defence of India Plan was formulated.⁵⁶ In 1931, the plan was modified to make it more limited in scope and aimed at a restraining action in the event Afghanistan showed symptoms of hostility or seemed inclined to ally herself with Russia. It was called 'the Pink Plan'.⁵⁷ It only aimed at the protection of the north-west frontier. A less ambitious plan was the result of the internal troubles which were increasing due to the Nationalist Movement.

Thus, early 1930s was a critical period for the British India Government. On the one hand, the frontier security and internal opposition demanded efficient loyal army, while on the other hand, the Indianisation demand appeared to them would weaken their position. However, they could not reject Indianisation of the Indian Army as that could annoy the Moderates—a pillar of the British. Hence, the British Government took up the matter at the Round Table Conference, November 1930—January 1931. A sub-committee on Defence was appointed with J. H. Thomas, a Member of the Parliament, as its chairman. The Indian members of this sub-committee were Srinivas Sastri, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Pheroze Sethna, M.R. Jayakar, Dr. B. S. Moonje and M. A. Jinnah.⁵⁸ This committee recommended that first steps should be taken to Indianise the Indian Army, though no time was fixed and secondly, a training college be established in India to train candidates for commissions in all arms and for this purpose a committee of experts be established. It also recognised the desire of the Indians to reduce the number of the British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and recommended that the matter be investigated by an expert committee.

As a result of the recommendation of this sub-committee, the Indian Military College Committee assembled in May 1931 under the Chairmanship of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Philip Chetwode to work out the details of the establishment of the Military College.⁵⁹ This Committee, had 6 official members, eight non-official members and three representatives from Indian States. It recommended the establishment of an Indian Military College with a training course of 3 years and an age of entry of 18 to 20 years. The number of vacancies in the college was fixed at 60. In addition, it recommended that 20 vacancies a year be earmarked for the Indian States. The majority favoured that 30 seats a year be reserved for the cadets from the ranks of the Indian Army. Of the remaining 30 vacancies, it desired that, 24 a year be opened to competition and for the remaining 6, the C-in-C be given right to nominate from among the candidates who qualify at the entrance examination but fail to secure a place in open competition. However, Sivaswamy Aiyer Moonje and Major General Rajwade dissented from the views of the majority as they desired a much higher proportion of the vacancies to open competition. They contented that the recommendations of the majority would unduly favour the classes then being recruited to the Indian Army at the expense of all other classes.⁶⁰ So far Indianisation was concerned, the Commander-in-Chief announced that the government had decided to extend Indianisation in the Indian Army immediately to a force equivalent to a complete division of all arms and a cavalry brigade, with proportionate provision for ancillary services, staff, etc. Nonetheless, it was still an experiment.

The Indian Military Academy was inaugurated on 10 October 1932 and from this time the Indians ceased to be eligible for admission to Sandhurst and Woolwich cadets passing out of the I.M.A. were to be given 'a Commission as an Indian Commissioned Officer in His Majesty's Indian Land Forces.' They were given reduced rates of pay and allowances than the prevailing rates for the officers of the British Army serving in the United Kingdom. The Indian Commissioned Officers started service as the Platoon Commander while the Sandhurst trained officers started service in the superior position of Company Officers.

The frontier security at this time demanded additional arms. In 1919, the Royal Air Force had given a valuable support to the ground forces in the military operations at the north-west frontier. It was gradually realised that effectively tribal unrest could be dealt by aircraft alone. The Holwell Committee was appointed to make recommendations on the proposals concerning the defence of the north-

west frontier particularly.⁶¹ It recommended the use of air force for the protection of the frontier. It was also pointed out that the use of the aircraft would be more effective and cheaper. The 'Pink Plan' against Afghanistan was based on the use of aircraft. In 1932, therefore, the Indian Air Force Act was passed and on 1 April 1933, the first squadron of the Indian Air Force came into being. Later the number of aircraft increased and on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War, it had three Flights in its First Squadron. Its equipments and aircraft were obsolete. The Audax were all obsolete planes and could provide no protection against the Japanese and Italian air forces.⁶²

Another arm, that was added for the defence of India, was navy. In the post World War I period, the emergence of Japan as powerful naval power, brought home the factor that something must be done for the protection of the coastline. In 1929, on the recommendation of the Rawlinson Committee, the Royal Indian Marine was converted into a combatant service. In 1934, it was renamed as the Royal Indian Navy.⁶³ However, before the Second World War, the force maintained was too small for any independent action and therefore its primary aim was to defend the major ports of India and support the Royal (British) Navy.

Still another significant change in the Indian Army during the period was the formation of the first unit of Indian Artillery as a Field Brigade at Bangalore in January 1935.⁶⁴ After the Revolt of 1857, when all the Indian artillery units were disbanded (except the mountain artillery), this was for the first time that the Indian artillery unit made its appearance.

While the frontier security accelerated addition of arms, the financial difficulties resulted in the disbandment of some Indian units. Two Indian infantry battalions and two railway companies of Sappers and Miners and the Indian Pioneers were disbanded.⁶⁵ It was estimated that their reduction would lead to a saving of Rs. 20,00,000 per annum.

The international situation was taking a turn and in 1938 a world war appeared imminent. It became necessary for the British Indian Government to have a look at the defence preparedness of India. The government appointed, for a critical examination of the armed forces, a committee under Major-General Claude Auchinleck (later Field Marshal & C-in-C, India). This committee is known as Modernisation Committee. It recommended early action to place India's defence organisation on modern lines.⁶⁶ Hence an Expert Committee on the Defence of India under Lord Chatfield, Admiral of the Fleet in September 1938 was appointed to examine and report the feasi-

bility of mechanising the Indian forces and to determine their strength.⁶⁷ It recommended modernisation of the Indian Army including the administrative services, medical, supply and transport and ordnance services. It also pointed out that with the modernisation, the effective striking capacity of the Indian Army would increase and therefore some reduction in the strength could be made to reduce expenditure. It proposed reduction of 1 British cavalry regiment and 2 British infantry battalions as also 3 Indian cavalry regiments and 14 infantry battalions. The committee also castigated the Indians for interfering with the defence matters. However, before the recommendations of this committee could be implemented, the Second World War started on 3 September 1939.

While the British Indian Government was taking initiative for modernising the Indian Army, the pressure from the nationalists compelled it to take up Indianisation issue again. They were not happy with the slow progress of Indianisation. The Indian officers themselves were not satisfied with the eight unit scheme or later with one division scheme. They resented markedly reduced chances for promotion and inferior status. As a result of the increasing resentment of the Indian officers and the Indian politicians, the Government of India appointed the Indianisation Committee of 1939 to examine the issue.⁶⁸ When the committee was drawing up the report, the Second World War broke out. The work of the Committee came to an end as the members of the committee had to return to their military positions.

Thus, the study of the Indian Army between the two World Wars, shows how its development was conditioned by the traditional relationship with the 'martial classes', political environment and security problems in India. Soon after the end of the World War I, in the retrenchment the cut was made in the newly recruited classes as the British trusted the 'old loyal classes'. Later when the controversy over this issue arose and the Indian public opinion desired doing away with the old recruitment policy, the British opened officers cadre to all classes but recruitment in the lower ranks continued to be restricted. The frontier security demanded strengthening of the army and the addition of certain arms. As a result, the Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy were created. It was Indianisation of the Indian Army that posed a serious problem for the British. While to placate the moderates, they desired to give concessions in this regard, the Civil Disobedience Movements forced them to keep sufficient number of the British soldiers as they could not totally rely on the Indian soldiers. Due to this dilemma, the progress of Indianisation in the inter-war period was slow and the concessions were made reluctantly.

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Status of Defence Services Vis a Vis other Services

R P GAUTAM

INTRODUCTION

A number of studies have been conducted to ascertain the relative status of various careers. For instance, Krishnan (1956), Cook (1962), Sharma (1969), Goldhamer (1972), Gautam (1975) and Grewal (1980) have studied the relative preference/status of a large number of careers including defence services. As per the findings of these studies the defence services have been placed between 3rd and 13th places. There appear following reasons for such a large variation.

Firstly the number of occupations included in each study has been different. For instance, on one hand is Sharma's study (1969) which lists only 21 occupations. On the other hand we can quote Grewal's study (1980) which has been conducted on 108 occupations. Secondly, most of these lists of occupations present a sketchy picture of occupational world. As a result, the candidates in every study have responded to a different stimulus. Thirdly, the design and methodology are also not the same in all the studies. Fourthly, the samples in all these studies have been different not only from the regional angle but also from the age and educational standards. In view of all these factors, the results are more likely to be different than being the same or similar.

However, most of these studies except that of Gautam (1975) have mentioned the defence services as a passing reference only. Besides, during the last decade since Gautam published his study in 1975, the defence services as well as our youth have passed through a chain of significant socio-political changes. It therefore, becomes desirable to study again the status of the defence services vis a vis other careers as perceived by our young students.

SAMPLE

Since the minimum academic qualification for commission in the defence services through NDA (National Defence Academy which is

the earliest stage) is to have passed XI standard, it was decided to conduct the study on XII Class students. To make the sample as representative as possible, the students were selected from each type of schools namely, the convent, the central and the ordinary-located at Allahabad. The procedure adopted to select the sample was as follows :

All the students available in one section of XII Class of BHS (Boys High School—a convent school which runs classes upto 12th) and the GIC (Government Inter College) were taken as the sample. The section in each institution was randomly selected by following lottery method. In case of Central Schools, all the male students of XII Class in two schools located at New Cantt and Manauri (Allahabad) were included in the sample since the number of students from a single school was far smaller than that from other Schools. The final picture of the sample emerged as follows :

<i>School</i>	<i>No. of Students</i>
Ordinary School (GIC)	55
Convent School (BHS)	55
Central Schools (New Cantt & Manauri)	50
	<hr/>
Total	160

METHOD

The list of occupations as developed by Gautam (1984) was chosen as a tool for data collection. It contains 45 occupations in all. But some of them, as author himself states in his report, are preferred by a very small number of students either due to their being highly specialized or too low on the ladder of social prestige. These careers were deleted and the final list as used in the study contained 30 occupations only (The same are shown under data-analysis).

Copies of this list were distributed to the students in a group in each school separately. The author then explained the purpose of the study and asked them to grade each career according to their own preference. They were told to write 1 against a career they preferred the most and 2, 3, 4,.....30 against each career in a descending order. No career was to be left blank. There was no time-limit but they were asked to complete the work as early as possible.

DATA ANALYSIS

An average preference score was calculated for each career by totalling all the preference scores it received from the whole sample

and dividing it by the size of the sample. School wise average preference scores were also calculated for all the three schools separately. All these scores were given a rank value in an ascending order. The same are given below :

<i>Careers</i>	<i>Ranks</i>			
	<i>Whole sample</i>	<i>Ordinary School</i>	<i>Central School</i>	<i>Convent School</i>
1 Agricultural Science	14	7	9	20
2 Architecture	18	20	16	13
3 Accountancy	11	12	24	1
4 Bank Services	3	5	6	2
5 Business	9	11	12	1
6 Clerical services	30	25	27	27
7 Civil Aviation	15	14	13	16
8 Contracting	19	19	21	11
9 Defence Services	6	11	2	5
10 Engineering	5	4	1	10
11 Farming	29	23	29	25
12 Hotel Management	16	26	15	7
13 IAS/Allied Services	2	2	7	1
14 IFS	1	3	4	3
15 IPS	4	1	5	6
16 Industrial Management	10	9	11	4
17 Insurance	17	10	23	9
18 Journalism	22	16	24	17
19 Legal Profession	21	19	22	14
20 Library Science	26	17	26	24
21 Medicine	8	1	10	18
22 Merchant Navy	7	13	3	8
23 Music	12	18	30	17
24 Painting	27	24	25	21
25 Photography	24	22	20	15
26 Postal Service	28	21	28	23
27 Science Career	13	6	8	19
28 Skilled jobs	23	27	17	12
29 Teaching	20	8	19	22
30 Veterinary Science	25	15	18	26

DISCUSSION

Above table reveals that the total sample has ranked the defence services at the 6th place among the 30 careers when viewed in the light of previous studies, these findings suggest that the defence services have moved upward in the spectrum of occupational preference of our adolescents. The five careers which have been placed above the defence services are IFS, IAS, Bank Services, IPS, and the Engineering respectively.

A striking feature of these career preferences is that the medical profession, hitherto a very popular career, has gone to the 8th place, i.e. below the defence services. Similarly this is also sadly surprising that the intellectual careers like scientific and teaching, have received quite low preferences, ie 13th and 20th respectively. Equally astonishing is the finding regarding farming which receive as low as 29th place in our predominately agricultural country. The lowest place is occupied by the clerical services as widely expected.

Now let us look at the school-wise preferences. Here we find much variations among the preferences of the students coming from different types of schools. For instance, the defence services have received 2nd, 5th and 11th places from the students of Central School, Convent School and the ordinary school respectively. Differences are equally striking among their first preferences. For instance, the ordinary school students have placed the IFS on the top while the central school students have preferred the engineering most. The convent school students have given first preference to the three careers namely Accountancy, Business and the IAS.

Their lowest preferences however, converge almost on the same careers irrespective of the school they belong to. For instance, the clerical services have been given 27th place by both the Central and Convent School students. The preference of farming varies between 23rd and 29th places.

The data on the whole reveals that the ordinary school students are still showing their preferences in a traditional manner. For instance, first three preferences are for IPS, IAS and IFS respectively. On the other hand, the convent school students' first preference revolves around commerce which has become quite popular in recent years.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the defence services have received 6th place among the 30 careers. The Central school students have ranked them at the

2nd place while the ordinary school students at the 11th place. The convent students' preference comes between the two i.e. at the 5th place. Since the vast majority of our students in the ordinary schools it is more appropriate to accept the defence services somewhere near 11th place only. As our sample does not represent the population of different types of schools in an appropriate proportion, it is not justifiable to accept the preferences of the whole sample at the face value. From this angle also it is more accurate to accept the preferences of the ordinary school students as more dependable and closer to reality.

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The Historicity of Burdwan

LIEUT GENERAL S L MENEZES PVSM

THE apt Commentry, that the demise of Sir Uday Chand Mehtab, KCIE, Maharaja of Burdwan, 'marks the passing of an age', and the ensuing evocative obituary in 'The Statesman' of October 11, reminded us of some of the history of the quondam Burdwan Raj. We should sequentially spare a few moments for the historicity of Burdwan itself, as also for some of the other figures in the Burdwan tapestry.

The "Imperial Gazetteer" (1908) records, "Burdwan has been identified as the Partalis or Portalis which, according to Greek geographers, was the royal city of the Gangarides". The Gangarides, or the Gangardae W. B. Oldham has conjectured in 'Some Historical and Ethical Aspects of Burdwan District' (1894), were Bagdis. They were the original stratum of the population of Burdwan, according to the 'Burdwan District Gazetteer' (1910). In the seventh century, the area formed part of the Gupta kingdom of Karna Suvarna, and subsequently, under the Sen dynasty of Rarh. Ballal Sen was the most famous of the Sen rulers, and introduced Kulinism amongst the Brahmins, Baidyas and Kayasthas. In 1199, the followers of Bakhtyar Khalji, the Pathan Governor of Muhammad Ghori, spread themselves over Burdwan. Subsequently, the greater part of Bengal gradually came under the control of governors who ruled at Gaur and Lakhnauti till 1338, when Muhammed Tughlak declared himself independent. Till 1574, the area was ruled by various independent kings of Pathan origin. Burdwan is first actually mentioned in written Muhammadan histories in 1574, in which year, after Daud Khan's defeat and death at Rajmahal, his family was captured in the town of Burdwan by Akbar's forces. Ten years later, Burdwan formed the scene of several engagements between Daud Khan's son, Kuttu, and the Mughal forces. In 1624 Khurram, afterwards Shah Jahan, captured the fort and town of Burdwan in his insurrection against his father, Jahangir.

1696 marked the uprising of Subha Singh, Zamindar of Chitua and Barda, who, with the help of the Afghan Chief Rahim Khan, slew the head of the Burdwan Raj family and captured all members, except his son Jagat Ram Rai, who escaped to Dhaka to seek assistance from Nawab Ibrahim Khan. Subha Singh was in turn killed by Raj Kumari Satyawati, whom he was attempting to outrage, and

who thereafter killed herself, as she felt defiled by his touch. The ostensible 'insurrection' of Subha Singh is of interest, as it led to the foundation of the first European forts in the then Mughal Empire, at Sutanuti (the Old Fort William, the site of the present GPO), Chandannagar and Chinsurah. The Nawab Nazim had only given general permission to the English, French and Dutch to defend themselves. Interpreting this permission in accordance with their respective inclinations, they transformed these settlements into forts. H.E.A. Cotton in 'Calcutta Old and New' (1909) records it slightly differently in Parts I and II respectively of his book, "Calcutta had now been nearly ten years in existence : but beyond the laying out by Goldsborough of the lines for a fort the settlement remained unfortified and unprotected. The opportunity came in 1696, while Eyre was still Agent. The insurrection of Rajah Subah Singh, who seized Hooghly and Moorshedabad, and advanced in December of that year upon Suttanutte, extorted from the unready Nabob Ibrahim Khan at Dacca the long-delayed permission to the English to "defend themselves". The settlement was secured from the attack of Subah Singh by means of the guardships, which lay at anchor in the river : and fortifications were hurriedly run up and rapidly pushed on after the withdrawal of the danger. A bastion and walled enclosure were completed by January, 1697, and we find the Company's servants at Calcutta writing to Madras for ten guns to arm the points"... "The idea of establishing a fortified fort somewhere near the mouth of the Hooghly, as the best means of protecting the English trade from the oppressive exactions of the Nabob of Bengal and his officials, seems to have been first suggested by William Hedges, who administered the Company's affairs in Bengal during the years 1682 to 1684. But the first step had still to be taken when Sir John Goldsborough (from Madras) came to visit Suttanuttee after Charnock's death in 1693; and a spot was ordered by him to be enclosed with a mud wall, pending the necessary permission. This was not conceded until 1696, and then only indirectly. The Hindoo Rajahs on the westward of the river having rebelled against the Imperial authority, the Nabob begged the English, French, and Dutch to take steps to defend their interests. The invitation was quickly accepted."

After the putting down of Subha Singh's insurrection by Aurangzeb's grandson, Azim-uz-Shan, the latter resided at Burdwan for three years, and built the Mosque which carries his name. He restored to Jagat Ram Rai his family's estates. In the beginning of the 18th century, the Marathas made their appearance and for the next fifty years Burdwan suffered severely at their hands. They captured

Hughli also, as well as the Mughal fort then located at the site of the house later built for the Superintendent of the Royal Botanical Gardens. Three miles of the proposed seven mile Maratha Ditch at Calcutta were also dug. In 1760, Burdwan was ceded to the East India Company by Mir Kasim. Raja Tilak Chand sought to resist the cession, but Major White's forces prevailed over those of the Raja on 29 December 1760.

Burdwan has some famous monuments. There are many fine temples, mainly built by the Burdwan Raj, including a group of 108 Sivalingam temples at Nawab Hat, built by Maharani Adhiswari Bishtu Kumari in 1788. There are several ancient tombs, historically the most interesting being those of Pir Bahram Shah, a Haji from Turkestan, who left Akbar's court on account of differences with the brothers Abul Fazl and Faizi, but died shortly after arriving at Burdwan; of Khoja Anwar Shah, who died in battle near Burdwan; of Sher Afghan, the first husband of Nur Jahan; and of Qutb-ud-din. What is the unusual story behind the adjacent tombs of Sher Afghan and Qutb-ud-din at Burdwan?

Ali Quli Khan (Sher Afghan) was done to death at a site reportedly near the Burdwan Railway Station on 30 May 1607 on Jahangir's orders, by Imperial troops led by the Governor, Qutb-ud-Din Khan Kota, who was also killed in the confrontation. Jahangir had desired Mehr-un-Nissa, Sher Afghan's wife, even before her actual marriage in 1595 to Sher Afghan. In 1594, Akbar had at Lahore betrothed the 16 year old Mehr-un-Nissa to 25 year old Ali Quli Khan, both of Persian families. Ali Quli Khan had earlier been given the cognomen 'Sher Afghan' (slayer of a tiger) for killing a tiger with his sword while accompanying the Mughal troops near Multan. Akbar had thereafter taken him into his bodyguard for his heroism. On 11 March 1595 Jahangir (then Salim) had observed Mehr-un-Nissa at the Nauroz celebrations at the palace at Lahore, and on 23 April, 1595 sought Akbar's permission to marry her. Akbar refused, as he had already in 1594 betrothed her to Sher Afghan (Earlier, Akbar had at Lahore entombed alive Anarkali, his chief wife Jodha Bai's maidservant, when Salim had wanted to marry her, and Anarkali had rejected Akbar's order to recant her love for Salim). Mehr-un-Nissa was married to Sher Afghan on 27 June 1595 at Lahore. The latter was given a jagir at Burdwan, and both moved there. At the time, Salim had told his friend Qutb-ud-din (Khubu), "I will set the Empire on fire if my request is not granted."

Sher Afghan and Mehr-un-Nissa lived quietly at Burdwan during the events that flowed from Salim's declaration of independence at Allahabad and the bitter dispute of succession between Salim and Khusrau. Akbar died on 17 October 1605. Sher Afghan was shortly after invited to Lahore by Jahangir and made to feel important in consultations. During a tiger hunt, he was taunted into grappling with a tiger barehanded, which he did. He killed the tiger by pulling out its tongue. Jahangir then prevailed on a 'mahout' to get his elephant to trample on Sher Afghan and his palanquin in a narrow street. Sher Afghan cut off the animal's trunk with his sword, and it expired. Apparently, several other unsuccessful attempts were made by the Emperor's minions, and Sher Afghan returned to Burdwan. Jahangir now appointed his foster-brother, Qutb-ud-Din Khan (the latter's mother had nursed Salim as an infant, and the two boys had been brought up together) as Governor of Bengal and Orissa, in place of Raja Man Singh, with the task of doing away with Sher Afghan. An earlier attack by 40 men on Sher Afghan in his bedroom proved abortive. Qutb-ud-Din then came with 200 men, apparently on the plea of investigating the previous attack. Fifty men cordoned and attacked Sher Afghan with their swords, but he still survived after killing 24 of them, including Khubu. He was eventually killed by the remainder keeping their distance and using their matchlocks. As he lay dying, he shouted to Mehr-un-Nissa, "Take hold of a dagger and use it to liberate yourself and thus escape the clutches of these barbarians." It is not known if she heard him, but she in due course became the Empress Nur Jahan, and so, in a way, the decay of the Mughal Empire commenced at Burdwan with the death there of Sher Afghan, for, as Muni Lal records in 'Jahangir' (1983), "Perhaps it may not be wrong to suggest that the decline of the Mughal Empire began with the ascendancy of Nur Jahan to a position of unrivalled authority".

“Angrez Pir”

P. C. ROY CHAUDHURY

DISTINCTION and Honour come to some after death under peculiar or dubious circumstances.

One such person was a Britisher Civilian John Wedderburn, Deputy Commissioner of Hissar. A man dedicated to his service he stood firmly against the rebels' insurrection of 1857. He was butchered to death and probably very few tears were shed and yet the grave of this man came to be known as *mazar* of a *Pir* (grave of a saint). Hundreds of people visit the grave today to pray and seek blessings and implementation of their desire. Hissar is a growing Head Quarter town of the Hissar District in Haryana and number of such people is on the increase.

A *Masolauleum* was raised later by the British authority over the grave and the area was converted as a Park. It came to be known as *Laat Bagh*.

It is said that about 20 years back an old village woman took the grave to be a *Mazar* and offered prayers and fervently wished for the acquittal of her son who had been convicted in a criminal case and sent to Jail. His appeal was then pending. To the woman's very great joy she found her son returning home acquitted as she also reached the home. The grateful woman and the son rushed back to their *Angrez Pir Sahib*. The son who knew the ways of the Britishers brought a bottle of whisky and offered it. Since that day the story spread that the *Angrez Pir* would fulfil desires if prayers are offered.

Peculiarly enough whisky or rum is almost an essential item for this offering. So John Wedderburn who was butchered to death is now paid homage as a *Pir*.

Offering of liquor is not uncommon in India. It is well known that *Karan* (wine) is offered before Kali, a Hindu Goddess. In the midst of a thick jungle in Champarn District in Bihar the writer had seen a sword and spear being worshipped with country liquor and it is said that the worship is done by the robbers and dacoits only. The writer had seen a lot of coins strewn at that place but none would dare touch them. He learnt that once a week a Sadhu who was dacoit before comes and gathers the coins. The famous deity of Kali at Ambar near Jaipur is also said worshipped with *Karan*.

It is learnt that an English speaking man has started collecting the whisky offered at Wedderburn's grave.

Book Reviews

INDIA'S SEARCH FOR POWER: INDIRA GANDHI'S FOREIGN POLICY 1966-1982,

by Dr. Surjit Mansingh, (Sage Publications, New Delhi/London, 1984, Pages 405; Price Rs. 165/-

ALTHOUGH professedly India never searched for power, but for peace, her efforts for peace gathered some power around her. Even Indira Gandhi herself stated on many an occasion that India was neither interested in Big Power status nor in the leadership of this region. Even though in this world of turbulence and confrontation, every state's foreign policy is largely determined by its national interests, Indian foreign policy could not divorce itself from its past history and tradition of universal peace and brotherhood preached by Shri Krishna, Buddha, King Ashoka, Nanak and Chaitanya. Nehru's Panchshil and non-alignment arose from India's old tradition and new aspiration. Indira Gandhi only followed in the footsteps of her father. She tried to strengthen the economic base of her country so that her foreign policy would be respected abroad. For that she showed great interest in non-aligned movement, North-South and South - South economic cooperation, reorganisation of international monetary system, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful settlement of disputes with all neighbours. The result was that by 1982, India could boast of having the 4th largest armed force in the world with large defence industries providing a significant degree of technological self-sufficiency, the 9th largest industrial economy and the third largest pool of scientists and technologists. India has developed the capacity to produce and export a large range of consumer goods, computers, machine tools, and power-generating equipment, and she builds steel mills, oil refineries, fertilizer plants and dams in other countries. She is the 6th country to launch space satellites with its own launch vehicles.

The author says that Indira brought a new measure of "pragmatism and flexibility" to India's foreign policy and a new emphasis on 'security, territory and prestige', and in the process, she demonstrated a willingness to use India's power to solve the Bangladesh crisis. The author thinks that Indira's failures on the

domestic, economic and political front restricted her manoeuvrability in foreign affairs. Dr. Mansingh has ably analysed India's bilateral relations with the major powers and the neighbouring countries and her foreign economic policies. In 1983, Mrs. Gandhi rose to the pinnacle of her international position, being elected as the Chairperson of NAM. She said: "the solution of the two dominating issues of our day, disarmament and development are not to be found alone or overnight."

The book contains some useful Appendices, References, and an Index. This is a valuable contribution to the study of India's foreign policy during the Indira era.

—B.C.

SELF RELIANCE AND SECURITY

By Col. (Retd) R. RAMA RAO

(Radiant Publishers. Pages 220. Price Rs. 125/-)

"A country depending on imports of defence equipment virtually subjects her defence and foreign policies to the veto of the arms supplier, since equipment and spares may be denied when the country faces threats of invasion", opines the author in his preface to the book under review. In his book, he emphasises the importance of self reliance, traces the history of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and records the performance of defence production.

An indication of the progress made in the field of defence production is that in 1947, India which had 16 ordnance factories (OFs) that produced only small arms and ammunition apart from clothing and such requirements of the armed forces, now has 33 OFs and produces items including tanks, anti tank and antiaircraft weapon systems, field guns, towed as well as self propelled, mortars, small arms, related ammunition, explosives, transport vehicles, optical and fire control instruments. In addition 9 public sector units; HAL, BEL, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd., Mazagaon Docks Ltd and some others, produce aircraft, communication and engineering equipment and naval ships. However, as the author observes, "Our defence production units produce only medium technology items.....the country still imports the more expensive aircraft, tanks and guns,..... Even in respect of items locally manufactured under license, such as aircraft, ships and tanks, we still seem to be dependent on external sources for the supply of certain critical and expensive components and special materials".

Our defence production rightly started with licensed production and transferred technologies, some advance is now claimed in

indigenous design in the way of the main battle tank (MBT) for the Army which is to be produced in the near future. A project for the manufacture of the ICV is also reported to be under progress. An important reason for our advance being slow is that while we are catching up, technology is marching on. Although the conventional weapons in use today in the way of, let us say, the samll arms, artillery and tanks are the same family of weapons as used during the Second World War, the varieties now being used/developed are for more sophisticated. Laser range finders, night sights, thermal sights and computer controlled guns are examples. Advances in the field of missiles, surface to air/surface to surface and so on are other examples.

Equipping the armed forces with weapon systems compatible with their role and regional environment needs no emphasis. Equally, self reliance in weapon systems is a desirable objective. Apart from industrial infrastructure, this requires a technological base as well as the updating of technology. India established DRDO in 1958 but indigenous designing in an environment of fast moving technology takes time. Hoping that after the recent heavy expenditure of about 4000 crores on aircraft purchases (Rs. 2000 crores for the Jaguars, Rs. 1200 crore for Mirages and Rs. 500 to 800 crore for 60 MIG 23 and 8 MIG 25) India will be able to produce indigenously designed light combat aircraft (LAC) with the GTX engine rather than go to foreign markets again when the next replacement of aircraft is due, the author acknowledges that "there are formidable difficulties in the way of emerging as a nation capable of producing high performance aircrafts" as industrially advanced countries" act in unison in placing impediments in the way of third world countries trying to acquire technology relating to aircraft production (or other important areas).

Apart from the issue of technological problem in design and production of weapon systems, complete self reliance is possible only if arms sales are accepted as a national abjective; numbers required for internal needs in case of many items do not justify indigenous design and production. In this connection, the author points out that "defence production, units are important elements of national industry in advance countries, they contribute substantially to national industrial production and foreign exchange earnings".

The book is a useful study of defence research and production which focuses attention on a number of important issues in these fields. A number of chapters are however devoted to basic explanation of weapon systems of the armed forces which would be of interest to the uninitiated only.

A.M.V.

INDIAN OCEAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY

by Lt Col (Retd) Bhupinder Singh

(B. C. Publishers, Patiala Price)

IT is well known that the ocean cover three fourths of the Earth's surface. So far they have served mankind for trade and for the provision of rich protein food. The same oceans have now become the hot beds of competitive exploitation political, material and in all other aspects.

The Indian Ocean which is of more intimate and important concern to us has for many years seen super power rivalry and the warships of the great powers are here to exert political influence to help their friends and to frighten their enemies or the enemies of their friends. Gunboat diplomacy is rampant in full force. The situation, is growingly tense; what makes it worse is the induction into the Ocean of nuclear weapons which can be delivered from the air, the surface and below the surface of the Ocean.

At this time the author has brought out a readable publication which outlines the importance of the Indian Ocean through the ages and now. He goes on, and at some length, describes the interests and the state of the littoral countries in the ocean; more importantly he outlines the interests of the Great Powers.

Diego Garcia has assumed great significance in our Ocean because it is a fullfledged base and provides facilities for the largest carriers, nuclear submarines and large bombers and reconnaissance maritime aircraft. This subject is dealt with in some detail.

The answer really is for the Indian Ocean not only to be declared as a zone of peace but for the great powers to recognise & implement it. But we are a long way for this ideal & the great powers are unlikely to move their forces away because they feel that their vital interests are at stake. The littoral countries are powerless because of their weakness and their lack of unity.

The author brings out very lucidly these vital aspects of the Indian Ocean and India's concern in these waters and how she should act to bring some unity amongst the littoral states in order to safeguard their vital maritime interests.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Edited by James H Buck and Lawrence J Korb
(Sage Publications—London Price \$ 28.00)

THIS is Volume 10 of a series of books on war, revolution and peacekeeping by an organisation calling itself Sage Research Progress based on the publishers of the same name.

This particular book tries to consider the leadership problems arising from the introduction of technological measures in warfare. The advent of better communications and the technical acquisition of information together with the shadow of the nuclear weapon are discussed. It also goes into the problems stemming from the All Volunteer Force in the armed forces of the USA.

While it could be said that 'push button' wars really need technical skills to deploy and utilise effectively the modern gadgetry available and for the use of ordinary management techniques, a leader has to possess something more. These qualities are exemplified by the 'heroic' leader who instinctively understands how to get the best out of the human material under his command. The qualities of this type of leader are enumerated in the book. These are those which are widely known in military circles. The writers declare that though it might be possible to sharpen these attributes by special training they must *already exist* in the person concerned. The most effective method to do this is to set an example from which budding leaders will learn. *Selection* of the right material is however the essential factor. In this connection the book refers in passing to the considerable pains taken to ensure that only the most suitable persons are detailed by the US Air Force in those establishments responsible for operating the nuclear trigger. Only the most stable elements are selected for this role.

There is nothing new in the book. It does show to what extent the scientific community concerns itself in matters military in the USA. Unfortunately a portion of the book is written in such jargon that it can only be understood with the use of a dictionary by the side of the reader. This is a tendency very evident in all such scientific literature from the USA which is a pity because it spoils the concentration of the reader.

The book can only be recommended as supplementary reading matter for study.

TRADITIONS AND CUSTOMS OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

by Maj Gen (Retd) Chand N Das

(Published by Vision Books Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, Price Rs 350/-)

Major General Chand N. Das, who was commissioned from Sandhurst in 1933 and retired in 1965, deserves congratulations for compiling this book. He has obviously taken a lot of pains in collecting information from various sources and collating it in this volume of over 500 pages. It has an impressive foreword by the late General T. N. Raina, MVC, Chief of the Army Staff from 1 June 1975 to 31 May 1978.

The author has dealt with all the three services of the Armed Forces—the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

The absolute essentiality of this publication became evident during a visit to a local Naval Organisation. Senior Officers of that organisation were requested to indicate which was correct: the description of the flag of the Chief of Naval Staff (CONS) given on page 67 or the illustration between pages 56 and 57. They were not certain! To clarify this point, this reviewer visited the office of the CONS, South Block, New Delhi, where the Flag Officer to the CONS confirmed that the description given was correct, but the illustration was that of a flag of a four star Admiral and NOT of the flag of the CONS!

Details not only of the origin of some of the customs and traditions, but also of certain items of uniform have been given. For example the Sam Browne Belt, named after General Sir Samuel James Browne, VC, GCB (1824-1901) of the British Army, who had lost an arm, was devised by that officer as a very convenient method of carrying his sword and revolver. It consisted of a leather waist-belt supported by a light strap passing over the right shoulder. It came into general use for officers in the wars of 1870-80 and is still worn. The original has been preserved by Sam Browne's Cavalry (12 Frontier Force) now in Pakistan.

The paragraphs on swords in the chapter on Dress Customs are very enlightening. Not only is the mythical origin of the Indian Sword given, but also the fact that the earliest swords excavated in the sub-continent date back to 2000 B.C. has been mentioned. The Sword of Honour is still the most prized award given to the Best All Round Gentleman Cadet from the Regular Course in the IMA at the end of every term. A list of all Sword of Honour Winners in the

IMA from 1934 to 1982 has been given in the book. The names of all IMA Gold Medal Winners should also have been included—the Gold Medal is awarded to the Gentleman Cadet standing first in the Order of Merit from the Regular Course.

The chapter on Mess Customs needs to be read and re-read by all officers. The compiler, however, is not correct in saying that officers “always wear a tie and coat if wearing European clothing, or a closed collar coat if in Indian-style dress”. There is considerable relaxation nowadays in this custom. Hence, this statement and APPENDIX H—Dress Etiquette for Officers—need to be modified.

Of the many items reproduced from the past and which are of considerable, are two letters from General K. M. Cariappa, the first Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. They should be read often by every officer. The ideas set out in them hold good to this day and will continue to do so in future.

The section on Discipline in Chapter 28 is excellent, especially the story Field Marshal Sir William Slim tells about himself.

“Long ago, when I was a Second-Lieutenant, I acknowledged a private soldier’s salute with an airy wave of my hand. My Colonel saw me and ordered the Regimental Sergeant-Major to place his cane on the ground saying, ‘Let Mr. Slim practise saluting it until he knows how to return a salute.’

“So to and fro I marched in sight of the whole battalion, saluting the Sergeant Major’s cane. I could cheerfully have murdered the Colonel...and more cheerfully, my fellow subalterns. At the end of ten minutes the Colonel called me up. All he said was, ‘Now remember, discipline begins with the officers.’

“He said: ‘True discipline is not someone shouting orders, at others. That is dictatorship, not discipline. The voluntary, reasoned discipline accepted by free, intelligent men and women is another thing. To begin with, it is binding on all, from top to bottom’.

There are many other useful and interesting bits of information in the book. Do you know why troops always step off with the left foot? Read the book to find out. Do you know how the name MHOW Originated? It was one of the military stations which was established by the British as their Military Headquarters of War. MHOW is the abbreviated form.

With all these customs, traditions and useful information, the compiler has not forgotten the importance of a sense of humour, which has always played an essential part in times of stress and strain.

Some examples of amusing notings or orders have been given. To quote :

"Extracts from the Royal Indian Navy Orders : 'Owing to the acute shortage of Navy Baratheas the skirts of the W.R.N.S.(I) will be held up until the needs of the Navy men are satisfied.'"

The publishers, too, deserve praise for producing this book, which is profusely illustrated and well got up. However, there are quite a few spelling and other errors; these need to be listed and a complete 'Errata' issued. The compilers and the publishers should aim at producing a revised edition from time to time just like an encyclopaedia or dictionary.

Finally, General Das in his Preface has thanked several of his friends for advice and assistance received while compiling this book, particularly Lieutenant-General M. L. Chibber, PVSM, AVSM, Major-General R. K. Gaur, Rear-Admiral L. Ramdas, AVSM, Vrc, VSM, Air Vice-Marshal T. J. Desa, Colonel Pyara Lal, AVSM. Secretary, United Services Institution and Captain G. S. Sen. Those not named deserve just as much praise as those mentioned.

All training establishments and every unit down to battalion or independent company level (equivalent units in the Navy and Air Force) should have at least one copy for reference. Officers are apt to overlook the traditions and customs of the past which really make the Armed Forces a disciplined and cohesive body.

J A F D

1939-1945: AUSTRALIA GOES TO WAR,

BY JOHN ROBERTSON,

PUBLISHERS DOUBLEDAY, SYDNEY AND AUCKLAND, 1984: 224 PAGES;
PRICE; NOT MENTIONED.

ALTHOUGH the Second World War took a toll of 30,000 Australian war dead, compared to double that number lost, from a smaller population, in the First World War, it has assumed epic qualities in the minds of Australians. No doubt, Australia's contribution in absolute terms, compared to the massive war efforts of her allies or enemies, was quite small, nevertheless it made a discernible impact on the shape of the war. The famous American war leader, General Douglas MacArthur, had his headquarters in Australia which made the most complete surrender of control over its armed services to America. All this made a great impact on Australian way of life since the Second World War, which meant a cultural shift from the British pattern to the United States', Like other parallel

powers, e.g. Canada and New Zealand, Australia had to evolve special war time relationships with both Great Britain and USA and to serve under British command. Unlike 1914-18, the Second World War saw balancing the risk of being invaded by the Japanese against the desire to help Britain's campaigns in the Northern Hemisphere. However, Australia's basic defence philosophy was that its security was part of the global security system based on international cooperation of like-minded nations.

The war integrated the isolated Australian with the world at large, as he fought almost everywhere—the Mediterranean, Western Europe, South-east Asia, and the South-west Pacific. Obversely, Australia never fought a campaign solely on its own resources. The 2nd World War images of Australians in Combat have remained unique-reminding them of their courage, sacrifice, fighting skill and dutiful labour, and, above all, their capacity to cope with a major challenge. The Australian housewives also contributed their mite by looking after their farms, joining the 20,000-strong Australian Women's Army Service (AWAS), whose activities included service on anti-aircraft stations in Australia. The war found the beginning of Australia's military aircraft manufacturing and armament industry. For example, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation built 250 Boomerang fighter aircraft, which were used in an army cooperation role in New Guinea and the Solomons. The author says in his concluding Chapter "Australia's Role in the War." "Obviously, much of world history since 1945 has been shaped by the Second World War. Its impact on Australia was tremendous. In many ways it was a bigger watershed than the Great War. It gave a great impetus to technological development and transformed Australia into a modern, albeit small, manufacturing economy." (pp.217-8).

Australian deaths in this epic war totalled 37,489 (Army 24,751, RAAF 10,562, RAN 2,176) half of which occurred in battle or due to battle wounds, and half occurred while in POW camps or as a result of aircraft accidents or other causes. Besides, five Australian War ships—the Sydney, the Parramatta, the Perth, the Yarra and the Canberra—with soldiers and crew on board were sunk.

The author has not only given an account of the military operations in which the Australian Forces were involved during the war, but also discussed 'Politics and Command', 'Equipping the Forces 1939-1945', 'A People's War', and 'Australia's Role in the

War.' The book is rich with a large number of high-quality illustrations, photographs and paintings,—and a few sketch maps. It contains notes on further reading, sources of illustrations and an Index.

It is a beautifully brought out publication, very interestingly written with the premium of bold comments, new ideas and broad perspectives. In order to understand post-War Australia or the War, from Australian view-point, one would like to read this book.

—B.C.

PATHS OF PEACE STUDIES ON SINO—INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

by T.S.Murty

(Published by ABC Publishing House

Price Rs. 150/-)

THIS is a work of very considerable erudition, compartmentalized to facilitate comprehension.

'Understanding Our Frontier Problem' is a follow-up of the author's 1978 book, "Frontiers: A Changing Concept". In this study the author suggests a checklist of questions that have to be examined, so that a methodology is available to those who want to go into the matter.

'What is Delimitation' tries to pin down the way people use the word, and bring out some uniformity in the way it is understood. We may or may not agree with the connotation proposed, but we should be deliberate in our choice of connotation.

'Boundaries and Maps' especially concerns itself with the boundary problem in the Himalayas. It is possible to elaborate by bringing in pre-war German studies and the work done by specialist organisations of the United Nations during the last 15 years, but the conclusions drawn may not be changed in any material way by such additional data.

'Watersheds and Boundaries' is there because of the interest in watersheds after the 1960 talks with China.

'Evidence on Traditional Boundaries' is difficult going, but the matter is one of those which has not been enquired into till now as a general issue. Evaluation of individual items of evidence occurs of course, in many arbitration awards and judgements to the International Court of Justice.

'Frontier Problem: An Overview' tries to put the entire Sino-Indian boundary in its historical perspective. While a boundary can be studied only kilometer by kilometer, stretch by stretch and

sector by sector, the author postulates that a frontier does have a dimension which can be understood only as available from its history. After scrutinising the historical context, he has included some data on recent developments, so that the study by itself may serve as a factual introduction to any student of the topic.

'The Chinese Claim to Arunachal' deals with one of the three sectors of our Himalayan frontier with China. It is where territory is being claimed by China, and also territory apparently ready to be given up by China, if her stipulations are met. The study strives to evaluate China's claim, answer whether the area adjoining Arunachal has been treated by China as part of Tibet, and finally examine the reality of the status of the areas in Arunachal which the Chinese occupied in 1962.

'Neville Maxwell on Tawang' is about a very important part of Arunachal, which our neighbour feels should be hers. Neville Maxwell brought out a highly readable volume for the western reader on the Sino Indian conflict. It was the result of a great deal of work, but a lot of it consisted of enthusiastic agreement with China, and disagreement with India as to the facts. Maxwell was given a splendid reception by Chinese leaders but not given much in the way of factual information. In India, on the other hand, it appears some people in the Services gave him data. After his book on the Sino-Indian conflict became a best seller, Maxwell wrote an article on Tawang in 1970. The author, having spent five years at Tawang, thought that Maxwell was not being quite fair in what he said. The author commented on the inaccuracies in Maxwell's article, Maxwell reacted, and Murty answered.

'Mon in Early Himalayan History' deals with a race of people who may have been the earliest to inhabit the mountain ranges dividing us from Tibet. The stray references to them in ancient Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan works have been brought together, as also the opinions expressed by orientalists from time to time. Murty has suggested some hypotheses which may explain the data gathered.

'Early Mon and the Foundation of Tawang Monastery' is a labour of love. The shrine is the biggest such in India and West Kameng one of the least studied parts of our country, as far as history is concerned. The Chinese say that West Kameng was Tibetan, and during 1962 their major military thrust was in this area. It seems to Murty that we should know a little bit more than what has been given out till now on the monastery and about the early history of West Kameng

Not too far away from Kameng and adjoining North Lakhimpur district of Assam was a medieval settlement in Arunachal. 'An Ahom Fort in Arunachal' is the story of Murty's discovery of this military settlement.

'Frontier Studies in India' deals with three errors in methodology which are often committed. These are: the failure to see administration in the context of the type of administration needed by an area at a given time, the use of secret records and data from such records going to discount public and formal pronouncements, plus the attempts to study a boundary without going into details of the boundary.

'Pasturage Practices in the Himalayas' should really be linked with the study of categories of evidence regarding boundaries. It has been dealt with separately, since it is not only a type of evidence on the boundary but also a way of life.

Whatever Murty says is backed by solid research and long field experience in India's border areas. Essential reading for understanding one of the serious problems India is facing today.

S L M

INDO-PAK CONFLICTS OVER KASHMIR

By Lt. Col. Bhupinder Singh

(Published by BC Publishers, Patiala Price Rs 99/-)

THE author is a former Officer Commanding 7 Cavalry, and later was the Head, Department of Defence Studies, Punjabi University, Patiala. A part of the book covers the part played by 7 Cavalry in the Jammu and Kashmir Operations in 1947-48. The book has an Introduction by Major General Indarjit Rikhye, who was a squadron commander with the Regiment in the Valley before taking over the Deccan Horse.

In nine chapters, the book encompasses the following in the respective chapters, with a conclusion to each chapter and an Epilogue to the book :

- 1) The strategic importance of Jammu and Kashmir, and its brief history up to October 1947.
- 2) The Pakistani invasion of the Kashmir Valley, Indian troops airlifted to Srinagar—27 October 1947, raiders encountered at Baramulla—28 October, and at Patan—29 October 1947.

- 3) The battle of Shalateng-7 November 1947, and the advance to and capture of Baramula-8 November 1947.
- 4) The recapture to Jhangar-18 March 1948, the recapture of Rajauri and the link-up with Poonch.
- 5) The events leading to the Zoji La battle of 1 November 1948, the decision to use tanks at Zoji La, and the battle of Zoji La.
- 6) A critique of the 1947-48 operations.
- 7) The 1965 Conflict.
- 8) Military Aid to Pakistan.
- 9) The prospect for Peace, including Pakistan's compulsions and motivations.

There have been several books already published, in India, Pakistan and the West in relation to these Indo-Pakistan conflicts, particularly that of 1947-48. This book adds to the material available on the subject, in particular relation to

- a) the part played by 1 SIKH in saving the Kashmir Valley in October-November 1947;
- b) armour in the battle between Jammu and Thana Mandi, leading to the Jammu-Poonch link up;
- c) the role of 1 Patiala in holding Zoji La for four months (May to August 1948) and denying the Pakistanis access through the pass;
- d) 7 Cavalry in the Zoji La battle.

In conclusion, it is useful to remember Major General Rikhye's observation in his Introduction as to our use of armour in 1947-48 in the Jammu and Kashmir operations, "The light tanks of 7 Cavalry and CIH played a key role in these battles. This became possible due to the absence of any antitank weapons with the Pak forces."

SLM

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